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INTRODUCTION 
If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few 
who are rich. 
- John Fitzgerald Kennedy1 
Summum ius summa iniuria. 
-Cicero2 
* The author wishes to dedicate this Note to the late Dr. David McKillop - a professor, 
mentor, and friend. His life's work lives on in the deeds of his students. 
1. Inaugural address (Jan. 20, 1961) (transcript available in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy 
Library). 
2. M. TULL! CICERONIS, DE OFFICllS I, 14 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994) ("Extreme justice 
is extreme injustice."). 
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The political outcry over prescription drug costs has been one of 
the most vociferous in recent memory. From tales depicting renegade 
seniors sneaking cheap prescriptions of Vioxx out of Tijuana across 
the border,3 to the promises of reduced prices made by front-runners 
during the 2000 Presidential election,4 the calls for lower drug prices 
have been forceful and demanding. This war for lower-priced pharma­
ceuticals fought by consumers, interest groups and politicians against 
the pharmaceutical industry itself has recently developed yet another 
front. The latest battle is over Medicaid.5 The new victims are the 
poor. 
Presently, federal statutory provisions in the Medicaid program 
provide relief from high drug prices through a mandatory rebate 
mechanism.6 Federal law requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
rebate their drugs sold to Medicaid recipients at a minimum level of 
15.1 percent of the average manufacturer's price of those drugs.7 In 
addition to the mandatory rebate, federal law provides for the discre­
tionary provision of prior authorization by which the states may serve 
the best interests of their Medicaid recipients in a cost-effective man­
ner.8 The federal Medicaid program allows states to condition pre­
scription of a covered drug on special prior authorization of that drug 
with a state official.9 Both the mandatory rebate and prior authoriza­
tion provisions serve to balance access and cost in' an attempt to pro­
vide necessary care for the indigent.10 
In the face of mounting pressure over rising drug prices, several 
states sought to expand the federal rebate and prior authorization 
3. Tim Weiner, Low Prices for Unregulated Prescription Drugs Lure Americans, N.Y. 
TIMES INT'L, Aug. 14, 2001, at A7. 
4. Alan Bernstein, Presidential Election Left Dimples All Over Y2, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, Dec. 31, 2000, at Al (noting that Governor Bush and Vice-President Gore nar­
rowly tailored their messages to capture the numerous voters concerned with high prescrip­
tion drug prices). 
5. Congress created the sister programs of Medicaid and Medicare under Title XIX and 
Title XVIII, respectively, of the Social Security Act of 1965. Medicaid, a federal-state 
matching program, pays for the medical expenses of low-income persons. In essence, the no­
ble goal of Medicaid is "to ensure access to health care for low income Americans." TEX. 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. COMM'N, TEXAS MEDICAID IN PERSPECTIVE (4th ed. 2002). 
See also infra Part I for a more detailed description of the nature and political history of the 
Medicaid program. 
6. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8 (West 2000). 
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(c)(l)(B)(i)(V) (West 2000). 
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 13%r-8(d)(5) (West 2000). 
9. For example, a state could declare Rogaine subject to prior authorization. As a con­
sequence of this designation, any time a physician prescribed Rogaine she would have to 
make a telephone request to a state commission. Only after permission by the commission 
could the drug be prescribed. The commissioner must respond by telephone or another tele­
communication device within 24 hours of the request. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(d)(5)(A) 
(West 2000). 
10. See infra Section J.B. 
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provisions in order to ft�rther reduce pharmaceutical prices for Medi­
caid beneficiaries.1 1  The most legally controversial of these state pro­
grams has been the "Maine Rx Program" ("Maine Program").12 Under 
the Maine Program, the Commissioner of the Maine Department of 
Human Services negotiates to obtain rebates above and beyond those 
required by federal law with pharmaceutical manufacturers.13 Al­
though these rebates are voluntary, those non-compliant manufactur­
ers are subject to prior authorization for their particular non­
complying drugs.14 Thus, Maine in effect uses the prior authorization 
as an incentive or a leverage device for extracting supplemental re­
bates from manufacturers for its citizens.15 
With the advent of the Maine Program in May 2000, controversy 
ensued. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
("PhRMA") quickly filed suit in the District Court of Maine16 arguing: 
(1) the prior authorization provision was preempted by federal Medi­
caid law; and (2) the mandatory rebate provision was an extraterrito­
rial regulation in violation of the dormant commerce clause of the 
Constitution.17 PhRMA asserted that the use of prior authorization as 
11. For example, Vermont, Maine, Florida, and Michigan. See Theresa Agovino, States 
seek ways to Reduce Cost of Drugs, WIS. ST. J., Aug. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25521619 
(describing Florida's, Missouri's, and Maryland's programs as well as the proposal for a 
multi-state buying consortium); Russell Gold et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sues Michigan 
to Block Attempt to Cut Drug Prices, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A2 (describing the 
Michigan program and the litigation by PhRMA in Michigan, Vermont, Maine and Florida). 
12. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2681 (West 2001). 
13. See Joan Henneberry, Addendum to State Pharmaceutical Assistance Programs: The 
Maine Rx Program, at www.nga.org/center/divisions/1,1188,C_ISSUE_BRIEF11D_2287,00. 
html (Aug. 3, 2001). 
14. Id. 
15. In addition to the rebate and prior authorization provisions, the Maine Program also 
contained another controversial element. The Maine Program prohibited unconscionable 
prices and unreasonable profits by manufacturers. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2697(2) 
(West 2001). This outrageous provision, however, was immediately deemed an unconstitu­
tional regulation of out-of-state manufacturers' revenues in violation of the dormant com­
merce clause. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv. , No. 
00-157-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *4-5 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000) [hereinafter 
Commissioner]. This provision is not discussed in the course of this Note for two reasons. 
First, extraterritoriality will be analyzed extensively in the course of the discussion on the 
rebate provision. That extraterritorial analysis can be cross-applied to the unreasonable 
profit provision. Second, the state of Maine never appealed the District Court's ruling on 
this issue. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 72 n.2 (1st Cir. 2001). 
Therefore, it is unlikely that other states will use the illegal profiting provision in enacting 
any similar price reduction Medicaid programs. As a result, the provision does not have the 
appeal of general application to warrant extensive discussion. 
16. Commissioner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *4. 
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have Power . . .  To regulate Com­
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." The 
dormant commerce clause is in effect a "negative" Commerce Clause prohibiting states from 
interfering with interstate commerce in the absence of congressional regulation. See Letter 
from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (M. Farrand ed., 1937) (noting that the Commerce Clause 
November 2002] Medicaid 605 
a leverage device ran contrary to the clear congressional intent limit­
ing the use of prior authorization to curbing over-prescription of un­
necessary medication.18 Therefore, PhRMA contended, federal Medi­
caid law governing prior authorization and the congressional intent 
behind that provision should preempt the Maine Program. PhRMA 
also argued that the supplemental state rebate provision under the 
Maine Program unconstitutionally regulated transactions between 
manufacturers and wholesalers that took place wholly out-of-state.19 
As a result, PhRMA asserted that such an extraterritorial regulation 
violated the dormant commerce clause.20 In Pharmaceutical Research 
& Manufacturers of America v. Commissioner, Maine Department of 
Human Services, the District Court of Maine agreed with PhRMA on 
both the preemption and dormant commerce clause claims.21 On ap­
peal, however, the First Circuit in Pharmaceutical Research & 
Manufacturers of America v. Concannon22 reversed on both points of 
law and upheld the Maine Program. The Supreme Court, realizing the 
significance of the dispute, granted certiorari in June of 2002.23 
The Maine Program presents a novel method for dealing with high 
prescription drug prices for Medicaid recipients and the public at 
large. Due to the potential of such a programs to cut Medicaid costs, 
other states have watched and continue to follow closely the litigation 
over the Maine Program as they attempt to formulate similar stat­
utes.24 Thus, the legality of the Maine Program may be of great conse­
quence for many states and their strategies in combating escalating 
pharmaceutical prices.25 Since the Maine Program and other similar 
"was intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States 
themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the positive purpose of the General Gov­
ernment . . . .  "). For an example of the Supreme Court's first major encounter in developing 
the doctrine, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
18. Commissioner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *20. 
19. Id. at *13-17. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at *4-5. 
22. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001). 
23. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 122 S.Ct. 2657 (2002). 
24. For example, in 2001 Florida passed the State Medicaid Formulary Law ("Florida 
Program"). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.912 (West 1998). The Florida Program requires drug 
manufacturers to provide rebates as a condition to get their products onto the state Medicaid 
formulary. PhRMA Goes to Coun Over Florida Rebates, MARKETLETTER, Aug. 20, 2001, 
available at 2001 WL 9080194. Those non-complying manufacturers will have their 
non-complying drugs subject to prior authorization. Id. PhRMA is currently in the midst of 
challenging this statute as well. The District Court judge recently ruled against PhRMA and 
upheld the program. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Medows, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1 186 
(N.D. Fla. 2001). PhRMA is preparing an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. See Jan Faiks, 
Press Release, Jan. 2, 2002, at www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/l/02.01.2002.320 
.cfm. 
25. In fact, Michigan most recently enacted a prior authorization statute patterned after 
the Maine Program. See 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 60; see also Jan Faiks, Press Release, Nov. 30, 
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programs that tie supplemental rebates to prior authorization may 
serve as revolutionary statutory models for the rest of the nation,26 as­
sessing the constitutionality of such statutes and the litigation arising 
under the Maine Program is of tremendous importance.27 In particular, 
the most salient legal issues regarding preemption and the dormant 
commerce clause require attention. 
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution28 provides the doctrinal 
basis for preemption claims. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, any 
state law running contrary to Acts of Congress must yield to those 
federal acts.29 Preemption claims normally fit into one of three catego­
ries: express,30 implied field,31 and implied conflict preemption.32 Im­
plied conflict preemption is the relevant preemption claim in the case 
of a Medicaid dispute over a prior authorization state statute.33 
2001, at www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releasesl//30.ll.2002.316.cfm. PhRMA challenged 
the Michigan law in state court in Michigan. See Phann. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Mich. 
Dep't of Cmty. Health, No. 01-94627-AZ, 2002 WL 27746 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2002); see also 
PhRMA v. Michigan Dep't of Cmty. Health, at www.phrma.org/publications/quickfacts/ 
30.11.2001.317.cfm (last visited Aug. 23, 2002). The court there struck down the law and 
ruled that the state agency went beyond its statutory authority in creating the program, and 
that the program also violated the Michigan state constitution. Jan Faiks, Press Release, Jan. 
7, 2002, at www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releasesl//07.0l.2002.321 .cfm. The Michigan 
litigation provides a unique approach in challenging state prior authorization statutes: as 
violations of state statutory and constitutional provisions. The analysis in this Note dealing 
with the federal constitutional issues of the Maine statute can also be applied to the 
Michigan program, which similarly ties voluntary rebates to prior authorization. 
26. See Daniel B. Moskowitz, Maine's Threat of Drug Price Controls ls a Model for 
Other States' Lawmakers, MEDICINE & HEALTH, June 28, 2001, at 2Sl (" 'As Maine goes, so 
goes the nation.' "); see also Maine Appeals Halt on its Rx Plan: Hopes for Expedited Review 
to Meet Jan I Start, MARKETLETTER, Nov. 20, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7544245 (stating 
that roughly twenty-eight other states are planning to introduce legislation similar to 
Maine's). 
27. Although discussion will focus primarily on the Maine Program, this Note refers to 
"prior authorization statutes" generally - those statutes that tie rebates to prior authoriza­
tion - with the hope of broadening the applicability of the analysis. 
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . .  shall be the supreme Law of the Land." 
29. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
30. Express preemption occurs where there is explicit preemptive language by Congress 
to take exclusive control of a certain field. Gade v. Nat'I Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 
88, 98 (1992). 
31. Implied field preemption occurs where the entire federal regulatory framework is 
"so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States 
to supplement it." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
32. Implied conflict preemption takes place, in the absence of express preemptive lan­
guage, either where congressional intent dictates that "compliance with both federal and 
state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 
373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), or where such intent demonstrates that the state law "stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941 ). 
33. Federal law does not expressly prohibit states from enacting prior authorization and 
additional rebate laws. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8 (West 2000). Therefore, express preemp-
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Since the conflict is implicit in implied conflict cases, ascertainment 
of congressional intent is of paramount importance in assessing these 
claims.34 A mere fragment or a strained inference depicting congres­
sional intent is not enough to preempt a state law.35 The presumption 
is against preemption,36 and only when congressional intent is shown 
to be "clear and manifest" will that presumption be rebutted and pre­
emption found.37 
Due to the integral role of congressional intent in implied conflict 
preemption cases, the interpretive devices used to ascertain intent may 
be crucial to the discovery of Congress's clear and manifest purposes. 
Consequently, whether a judge is committed to a textualist or a pur­
posive paradigmatic framework38 may result in the use of widely 
varying legislative materials and ultimately result in different findings 
regarding preemption.39 Similarly, the nature of the statute involved 
may lend guidance as to the discovery of true congressional intent and 
a finding for preemption.4° For example, in the case of Medicaid, the 
statute embodies a delicate balance of compromises between medical 
professionals, patients, manufacturers, federal legislators, and state in­
terests.41 Therefore, identifying the inherent nature of the statute at 
tion does not apply. Additionally, Medicaid is a joint federal-state program. See MARK R. 
DANIELS, Introduction: The Inconsistency and Paradox of American Health Care, in 
MEDICAID REFORM AND THE AMERICAN STA TES 3 (Mark R. Daniels ed., 1998). Therefore 
field preemption is not the appropriate category as the states occupy a very large part of the 
Medicaid regulatory scheme. Thus, the relevant preemption category is one of implied con­
flict - whether the state prior authorization statutes stand as obstacles to the accomplish­
ment and execution of the full congressional purposes and objectives behind Medicaid. The 
First Circuit also recognized that only implied conflict preemption was at stake in assessing 
the Maine Program. The court stated: "There is no explicit language in the Medicaid statute 
that forbids the Maine Rx Program. Nor is the doctrine of 'field' preemption relevant, as 
Medicaid is a cooperative federal and state program . . . .  Therefore, we consider only im­
plied conflict preemption as a basis for PhRMA's argument." Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of 
Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 74 n.6 (1st Cir. 2001). 
34. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 96 ("The question of whether a certain state action is pre­
empted by federal law is one of congressional intent."); see also Retail Clerks lnt'I Ass'n v. 
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (noting that "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone" in preemption cases). 
35. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. See infra Section I.A for a discussion of the textualist and purposive interpretive ap­
proaches. 
39. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 853 (1997); see also Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Pre­
emption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1153 (1998) 
(characterizing Boggs as dealing with the outcome-determinative interpretive debate over 
textual and purposive approaches in an implied preemption context). 
40. See, e.g., Int') Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (recognizing the balanced 
nature of the Clean Water Act in its preemption analysis); Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (taking into account the nature of the avocado quality 
regulation in its preemption inquiry). 
41. See infra Section J.B. 
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hand may provide guidance to a judge seeking to interpret that statute 
in a manner consonant to the underlying nature and the corresponding 
purpose behind the various legislative compromises. 
In addition to the preemption issue, programs like Maine's come 
under constitutional attack as violations of the dormant commerce 
clause. The dormant commerce clause forbids states from unduly bur­
dening interstate commerce even in the absence of specific congres­
sional regulation.42 Courts analyze state statutes under varying levels 
of scrutiny corresponding to the degree a statute facially discriminates 
against out-of-staters.43 Of pertinence to this Note are two specific 
categories of laws: laws that regulate extraterritorially44 and laws that 
are facially neutral.45 
The preemption and dormant commerce clause issues serve as the 
largest stumbling blocks in the passage of statutes like the Maine Pro­
gram. Clearing these constitutional hurdles is necessary before such 
programs can become a reality and a long-lasting solution to high pre­
scription drug prices. This Note contends that these constitutional 
hurdles cannot be cleared. Part I argues that the state prior authoriza­
tion statutes are preempted by federal Medicaid law. Part II then con­
tends tliat the state prior authorization statutes violate the dormant 
commerce clause of the Constitution because they regulate extraterri­
torially and alternatively fail under a dormant commerce clause bal-
42. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY & 
WAITE (1937). See generally Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. 
L. REV. l (1940); Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power- Revised Version, 
47 COLUM. L. REV. 547 (1947); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to 
Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protection­
ism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). 
43. See Eule, supra note 42. 
44. The Supreme Court has held that state laws that extraterritorially regulate out-of­
state conduct of business are per se unconstitutional. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 
(1989); CTS Corp v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. 
New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 
(1982). Such statutes project legislation onto other states and therefore burden interstate 
commerce by undermining state sovereignty. See Brown-Foreman, 476 U.S. at 582-83. As a 
result, extraterritorial laws are subject to strict scrutiny. 
45. Laws that regulate commerce by facially treating in-slaters and out-of-staters alike 
are held to the lowest level of scrutiny - the balancing test. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 
U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Under the balancing test, the burdens imposed by the state law on 
commerce are weighed against its benefits. Id. If those burdens are clearly excessive in con­
trast to the putative local benefits, then the law is struck down in violation of the dormant 
commerce clause. Id. 
In applying a balancing test to a state statute, due to the broad discretion of the test, it is 
crucial to place the appropriate items in the balance. In addition to traditional items regard­
ing effects on commerce, judicial concerns and ideals behind dormant commerce clause the­
ory may serve to tip the balance. Such judicial concerns vary, but include, among other 
things, interpreting statutes to guard against protectionism, or to encourage national uni­
formity, or to advance the interests of vulnerable minorities. See generally Regan, supra note 
42 (discussing judicial concerns within the rubric of the dormant commerce clause). These 
concerns may be as weighty as the effects on commerce. 
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ancing test.46 This Note concludes that state prior authorization stat­
utes, such as the Maine Program, are unconstitutional devices that also 
fail to provide an appropriate remedy for high prescription drug 
prices. 
I. THE STRONG MEDICINE OF PREEMPTION 
In examining prior authorization statutes, such as the Maine Pro­
gram, the key issue in the preemption context is ascertaining congres­
sional intent. If the state statutes "stand[ ]  as . . obstacle[s]" in the ac­
complishment of federal objectives, then courts must find such statutes 
preempted under implied conflict preemption standards.47 Determin­
ing congressional intent is not, however, an easy task. Moreover, 
seemingly multiple expressions of congressional intent confound and 
confuse the inquiry in light of varying interpretive theories.48 This Part 
argues that, subsequent to a court adopting a more paradigmatic and 
politically contextual approach in searching for congressional intent, 
the prior authorization statutes will be deemed to run contrary to that 
congressional intent and preempted by federal law. Section I.A argues 
that adopting a purposive interpretive theory in examining the rela­
tionship between the federal Medicaid statute and the state laws prop­
erly fulfills the judiciary1s role within the legislative process and leads 
to the conclusion of preemption. Section I.B argues that Medicaid is a 
delicate balance of compromises and that courts must find preemption 
in order to preserve the series of compromises that embody the fed­
eral legislation. 
A. A Purposive Framework: The Search for Intent 
The two major statutory interpretive theories that battle within the 
juridical theatre are textualism and intentionalism.49 A court adopting 
46. The Supreme Court has, however, in the past balanced an extraterritorial statute 
rather than automatically deem it per se unconstitutional. See Edgar, 457 U.S. 624. There­
fore, it may be inappropriate to consider balancing and extraterritoriality as alternative 
standards. Nonetheless, many of the extraterritorial cases dispense with balancing alto­
gether. See supra note 44 (listing cases). Moreover, there may be a presumption against bal­
ancing developing on the Court. See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (pos­
iting that a balancing test is "ill suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken 
rarely if at all"). 
47. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
48. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Patterson v. McLean: Updating Statutory In­
terpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988) (discussing the numerous models of statutory inter­
pretation). 
49. Id. at 22. For excellent discussion on the competing views on textualism, see Antonin 
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts 
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997), and HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT 
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a textualist approach to statutory interpretation looks to the plain 
meaning of the statute - usually exclusively and at the expense of the 
legislative history - in order to determine the legislature's intent in 
enacting the statute.50 Intentionalism, on the other hand, posits that 
contextual analysis is necessary to discern the full meaning of the stat­
ute's terms.51 One intentionalist model, known as purposivism, uses 
the context of the statute's text, legislative history, and circumstances 
surrounding enactment in order to discover the broad purposes em­
bodied in the legislation and to fit those purposes into the entire fabric 
of the law.52 The purposive judge operates from the premise - some­
times troubling to textualists and public choice scholars - that the 
legislature acted with a purpose.53 This Section first argues that pur­
posivism is the more jurisprudentially sound interpretive theory within 
the preemption setting54 in that it allows the judiciary to fulfill its role 
within the legislative process. Only by focusing on the interpretive de­
bate first can a court confidently venture into the ambiguities of the 
Medicaid statute armed with the most appropriate and powerful 
weapons from its paradigmatic arsenal. That is, the arguments ad­
vancing purposivism must be firmly established before a court can 
grapple with the heart of the legal controversy over prior authoriza­
tion. 
From this interpretive starting point, this Section then directly con­
fronts the difficulties of the prior authorization statutes and argues 
that federal law preempts the Maine Program and similar prior 
authorization state statutes. A critical analysis, in light of a purposive 
framework, of the Maine Program and the two related judicial opin­
ions concludes that the First Circuit used a myopic textual approach 
and failed to take into account the legislative history dealing with prior 
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF 
LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) on purposivism. 
50. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 23. 
51. Id. 
52. Jordan, supra note 39, at 1202-05; see also HART & SACKS, supra note 49, at 1124-25. 
53. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 26; see also HART & SACKS, supra note 49, at 1125; 
Jodan, supra note 39, at 1204. For a discussion on public choice theory and the possible in­
consistencies with the doctrine of purposivism, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Poli­
tics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 
VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation 
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); 
Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 
U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory 
and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 
TUL. L. REV. 803 (1994). 
54. Whether or not purposivism is the better interpretive approach in general is an issue 
that falls outside of the purview of this Note. This Note argues that, within the limited setting 
of implied conflict preemption cases involving Medicaid disputes, purposivism serves as the 
stronger interpretive paradigm. 
November 2002] Medicaid 611 
authorization and the context of other states' implementation of prior 
authorization in accordance with this legislative history. 
1. The Doctrinal Formulation 
Purposivism provides the strongest interpretive foundation for as­
sessing preemption disputes. A court's adoption of a purposive ap­
proach is better than the utilization of a textual one in examining pre­
emption questions in general and Medicaid disputes in particular.55 . 
Purposivism allows the judiciary to fulfill its role as an active partici­
pant in the lawmaking process - a role especially important in the 
context of preemption.56 This view is based upon the Founders' belief 
that each branch of government is interdependent in its contribution 
to the deliberative and lawmaking process.es.57 This judicial role be­
comes of supreme importance in the preemption setting because 
courts are the only bodies that can properly manage federalism con­
cerns - the very concerns at the foundation of preemption conflicts.58 
Because Congress "cannot, ex ante, draft meaningful preemption pro­
visions . . .  [and] Congress has demonstrated an inability to modify the 
language of preemption provisions even in light of judicial decisions 
pointing out textual inadequacies," then it logically follows that "Con­
gress is even less likely to manage federalism in the implied preemp­
tion context."59 
Purposivism, furthermore, provides judges with the ability to go 
outside of the inadequacies of the text in finding legislative intent, thus 
better managing federalism concerns. Congress is simply unable to 
imagine every undesirable application of its statutory provisions in or­
der to evince an explicit preemptive intent.60 A purposive judge can 
seek guidance from legislative history and the overall context of the 
55. Jordan, supra note 39, at 1192 ("[A]lthough a textual approach to statutory interpre­
tation may be sound in many contexts, the approach is unsatisfactory in the context of pre­
emption."). 
56. Id. at 1219; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 
GEO. L.J. 319 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 405, 426 (1989) (noting that "resort to purpose was an effort to maintain the 
role of the courts as agents of the legislature while at the same time acknowledging the in­
adequacy of textualism"). 
57. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 1 (1997); JOHN E. NOWAK 
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 3.5 (5th ed. 1995) (explaining the interdependence and in­
termingling between the branches and refuting the notion that the three branches operate 
separately in compartmentalized spheres - all in culinary terms: "While people sometimes 
refer to the three branches of the federal government as a three-layer cake, it is more accu­
rate to think of it as a marble cake"); Jordan, supra note 39, at 1220. 
58. Jordan, supra note 39, at 1218-19. 
59. Id.; see also Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ER/SA Pre­
emption? A Case Study of the Failure of Text11alism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 96 (1996). 
60. Jordan, supra note 39, at 1220. 
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legislation within the grand legal setting in order to determine 
Congress's purposes. A textualist judge, on the other hand, would be 
forced to abandon her role in adjudicating federalism disputes in the 
absence of textually explicit intent.61 Purposivism is the superior inter­
pretive framework in implied preemption cases generally because its 
enhanced interpretive devices better accommodate Congress's limita­
tions in statutory creation and amendment. 
In addition, in the particular implied preemption case involving a 
Medicaid dispute, purposivism provides the superior paradigm. Often 
the degree of judicial activism in preemption cases will depend on the 
federal law at issue.62 Medicaid requires an especially heightened judi­
cial role because of the pervasive and inherent federalism concerns 
found within the administration, nature, and history of the program.63 
In describing the nature of the Medicaid program, one political theo­
rist notes: 
Federalism, a fundamental feature of American governance, profoundly 
shapes Medicaid. The joint responsibility of the national and state gov­
ernments for funding and implementing the program has enmeshed it in 
perennial debates about the appropriate division of labor, or balance of 
power, between levels of government in the federal system.64 
In addition, the political history of Medicaid has been a tumultuous 
one with the federal-state relationship constantly changing.65 An un­
derstanding of the greater legal fabric and historical context of the 
Medicaid program allows for a more involved judicial search focusing 
on the true spirit and meaning of the law.66 Medicaid, due to its history 
61. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and 
Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 280 (1997) ("[T)extualism may actually 
frustrate the legislature's design, particularly when a statute is applied in circumstances not 
expressly contemplated by the legislature, because the statute's words will not always convey 
the full import of the legislature's policy choices."). 
62. Jordan, supra note 39, at 1220. 
63. Michael H. Armacost, Foreword, in MEDICAID AND DEVOLUTION: A VIEW FROM 
THE STATES, at vii (Frank J. Thompson & John J. Diiulio Jr. eds., 1998). 
64. Id. 
65. See, e.g., John D. Blum, Overcoming Managed Care Regulatory Chaos Through a 
Restructured Federalism, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 327, 329-30 (2001): 
While Medicaid affords states' discretion concerning the scope of benefits and administra­
tion of their respective programs, the program operates under federal oversight, and the his­
tory of this dually administered enterprise has been one of contention between the respec­
tive levels of government. In particular, federal and state regulators most often disagree 
about funding, and over the years they have had a series of intergovernmental disputes re­
lated to joint financing responsibilities which have accelerated with heightened federal man­
dates being placed on state Medicaid programs. 
See generally JEAN DONOVAN GILMAN, MEDICAID AND THE COSTS OF FEDERALISM, 1984-
1992 (1998) (describing the changing federal-state relationship within Medicaid). 
66. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892), for the purposiv­
ist motto that a "thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, 
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." 
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and nature, demands a more searching judicial inquiry designed to up­
hold the spirit of the law and maintain the federalism issues found 
therein. 
While the textualist judge would argue that the purposive ap­
proach only leads to judicial over-reaching and impermissible legis­
lating,67 such concerns are exaggerated and unwarranted in the pre­
emption context. The textualist judge contends that her purposivist 
colleague can easily abandon the statutory text in order to impute a 
purpose that could easily be a judicial one not envisioned by the leg­
islature.68 The textual approach, on the other hand, serves the ideals of 
judicial restraint by keeping the legislative role in the hands of 
Congress and not the court.69 The textual approach purports to har­
ness the dangers of judicial lawmaking by preventing judicial consulta­
tion of legislative materials and the social context of the statute.70 Al­
though the concern over judicial over-reaching is noteworthy, it can be 
eased and refuted - at least in the preemption context - in three dif­
ferent ways. 
First, a purposivist judge does not abandon the text, but rather 
looks to extra-textual materials only after finding that the text is am­
biguous as to the statute's purpose.71 Judicial restraint in the form of 
deference to the text still remains in a purposive world. Those "pur­
posivist" judges who seek to manipulate the text through the expan­
sion of interpretive factors grossly misapply purposive theory.72 These 
same manipulators could just as easily manipulate under the guise of 
67. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 28; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original In­
tent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 62-3 (1988) (the search for 
intent "greatly increases the discretion, and therefore the power, of the court"); cf Orrin 
Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 43, 47 (1988) (positing that in constitutional adjudication the legislative history "often 
provide[s] the only restraint upon an expansive and inaccurate interpretation of what (the 
constitutional] clauses were originally drafted to accomplish"). 
68. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 28; A. Michael Froomkin, Climbing the Most Dan­
gerous Branch: Legisprudence and the New Legal Process, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1071, 1083 
(1988) (stating that "[a]rmed with an attribution of the statute's general purpose, the court 
can adapt the text of the statute to changing circumstances without, one assumes, too much 
concern for the embarrassments of specific language."); Redish & Chung, supra note 53, at 
817 ("Because a purposivist judge willingly posits a reasonable legislature - an assumption 
that is not necessarily valid in all instances - she can hardly guarantee that the purposes she 
discerns represent the actual purposes of the enacting body."). 
69. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 23. 
70. Id. ("By restricting courts to the language of the statute, textualism attempts to pre­
vent the creative judicial lawmaking that can occur when judges consult legislative materials 
and the social context of the statute."). 
71. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 28-29 (arguing that "Hart and Sacks advocated con­
textual analysis as the way to resolve the ambiguities inherent in language"); Gebbia-Pinetti, 
supra note 61, at 284-85 (noting that a purposivist judge "first examines the statutory lan­
guage, because the text is the best evidence of the legislature's intent or the statute's pur­
pose"). 
72. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 28-29. 
614 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:602 
the textualist framework - albeit with fewer tools - in order to meet 
their purposes.73 Thus, the textualist's concerns for the primacy of the 
text and the prohibition against manipulation and de facto judicial 
legislating are still safeguarded under a purposive approach. 
Second, grasping onto the face of the text without regard to the 
depth of congressional intent can lead to strained interpretations that 
are wholly inaccurate.74 It is the search for accuracy that requires in­
creased judicial involvement through a purposive framework. If the 
text is ambiguous, the purposivist judge uses legislative history and 
other extra-textual materials in order to interpret the statute.75 The 
textualist would argue against the use of such materials and would ac­
cept a "substantial margin of error in identifying legislative will" for 
the sake of restraint.76 Under the purposivist framework, "an increase 
in accuracy is purchased at the price of greater opportunities for judi­
cial policymaking."77 The trade-off between restraint and accuracy, 
however, is far from equal. 
The inaccuracies of'textualism can produce contrived interpreta­
tions that lack coherence and are based on unnatural inferences.78 
Moreover, the benefits of restraint found through the abandonment of 
extra-textual devices are illusory. As one legal scholar notes: 
We should not insulate ourselves from the context in which legally sig­
nificant words were uttered if we care about ascertaining what the 
speaker intended to convey. Whether we see this upon our initial reading 
of the document (intrinsic ambiguity), or only later after we have con­
ducted adequate investigation (extrinsic ambiguity) is ultimately of little 
significance. 79 
The reason that such distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic ambi­
guities become seemingly irrelevant is that the introduction of context 
into the interpretive melting pot does not eliminate or create new in­
terpretations; rather context makes some interpretations "more salient 
73. In fact, some scholars argue that textualism needs restraint from a different form of 
manipulation. See A. Michael Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A 
Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due 
Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687, 689 n.8 (1992) ("[J]udicial re­
straint should prevent the Court from elevating its affinity for linguistic simplicity and con­
sistency across the statutory lands�ape over Congressional intent."). 
74. See Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textua/ism in Statutory 
Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235, 258. 
75. See Redish & Chung, supra note 53, at 816. 
76. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 27. 
77. Id. 
78. Solan, supra note 74, at 258. 
79. Id. at 256; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 263-
64 (1990) (describing the failure to examine context in evaluating textual clarity as the "plain 
meaning fallacy"). For an example of Posner's "plain meaning fallacy," see Federal Deposit 
Ins. Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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and others less salient."80 Therefore, the benefits of restraint derived 
from abandoning extra-textual devices are limited and yet serve to 
undermine the ascertainment of accurate results. 
Finally, the concern over excess judicial involvement is misplaced 
in the preemption setting. Preemption calls for more judicial involve­
ment because preemption disputes can be characterized as judicial in 
nature insofar as they involve the allocation of authority.81 As opposed 
to the creation of laws for th.e regulation of conduct, preemption deals 
with federal-state relations and the potential invalidation of laws.82 
Such a topic is one for judicial eyes; therefore, textualism hampers the 
judiciary from becoming involved in a realm that demands heightened 
judicial responsibility. 
Thus, purposivism is a superior interpretive theory to textualism in 
preemption disputes because it allows the court to manage federalism 
concerns in an area of law - Medicaid - that desperately needs such 
management. Although the textualist judge argues for a more re­
strained approach in order to keep the judiciary in check, ultimately 
her concerns are overstated relative to purposivist theory. Moreover, 
the textualist judge sacrifices accuracy for limited checks on judicial 
over-reaching, and undermines the inherently judicial task of assessing 
preemption disputes. 
2. Purposive Application: The Maine Rx Program 
Application of the purposive approach to the conflict between the 
Maine Program and federal Medicaid law clearly demonstrates that 
the Maine Program must be preempted. A critical analysis of the First 
Circuit decision in Concannon83 demonstrates that the First Circuit 
ignored the clear legislative history, the subsequent state statutes, and 
the proposed regulations by the Health Care Financing Administra­
tion ("HCFA") evincing the purpose of prior authorization embodied 
in that history. By taking these three important factors into account, 
the Maine law stands as an obstacle to the execution and accomplish­
ment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 
The statutory text of the federal Medicaid program is silent as to 
the situations in which prior authorization may be implemented. Fed­
eral Medicaid law explicitly provides for prior authorization under 
limited circumstances.84 The statutory language alone, however, fails 
80. Solan, supra note 74, at 256-57. 
81. Jordan, supra note 39, at 1220. 
82. Id. 
83. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001). 
84. Federal law states: "A state plan under this title . . .  may require . . . the approval of 
the drug before its dispensing . . .  only if the system providing for such approval . . .  provides 
response by telephone or other telecommunication device within 24 hours of a request for 
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to provide Congress's intentions as to the limitations on the use of 
prior authorization. Standing alone, the text might stand for the ideal 
that prior authorization may be implemented for any purpose. 
An examination of the legislative history, however, shows that 
Congress had a specific and limited scope for prior authorization. The 
House Reports illuminate that Congress intended states only to have 
the option of imposing prior authorization in order to safeguard 
against unnecessary over-prescription of drugs and to provide for a 
proper balance of quality and economy.85 As the District Court of 
Maine noted, "It may have never occurred to Congress that the Medi­
caid program could be hijacked to provide leverage for other pur­
poses . . . .  Maine's Rx rebate program has nothing to do with these 
concerns of unnecessary use of prescription drugs or safeguarding 
Medicaid payments."86 
In addition to the legislative history, the circumstances surround­
ing enactment shed insight into congressional purpose and serve to 
place the statute in its appropriate legal context.87 In assessing the le­
gal landscape, an important factor to consider is how prior authoriza­
tion was most commonly implemented by the states immediately after 
the provision was enacted in 1990. In a paper published in the early 
1990s, Drs. Robert Buchanan and Scott Smith found that the "most 
common method used by the Medicaid programs to enforce their poli-
prior authorization; and . . .  provides for the dispensing of at least 72-hour supply of a cov­
ered outpatient prescription drug in an emergency situation." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-
8(d)(5)(A)-(B) (West 2001). 
85. See H.R. REP. No. 101-881, at 98 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2110 
("As under current law, States would have the option of imposing prior authorization re­
quirements with respect to covered prescription drugs in order to safeguard against unneces­
sary utilization and assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality 
of care. However, the Committee does not intend that States establish or implement prior 
authorization controls that have the effect of preventing competent physicians from pre­
scribing in accordance with their medical judgment."); H.R. REP. No. 101-964 Part B (1990) 
("Except in the first year following approval of a new drug, States are permitted to subject 
any covered outpatient drug to prior authorization. States may limit quantities of drugs, pro­
vided the limitations are necessary to discourage waste."). 
86. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., No. 00-
157-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *20 n.12 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000). 
87. The purposivist judge need not limit herself only to the text and legislative history in 
ascertaining the statute's purpose. Redish & Chung, supra note 53, at 816. The purposivist 
judge must also examine the entire "legal landscape" in order to properly interpret the stat­
ute in a manner consonant with the greater legal context. Id. While the text and legislative 
history inform the more immediate purposes of the statute by allowing glimpses into the en­
acting Congress's mind, the legal landscape involves assessing the dynamic legal, social and 
political forces that change and shape the statute into one that fits into the legal system as a 
whole as it develops throughout time. See HART & SACKS, supra note 49, at 1124 ("The pur­
pose of a statute must always be treated as including not only an immediate purpose or 
group of related purposes but a larger and more subtle purpose as to how the particular stat­
ute is to be fitted into the legal system as a whole."). 
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cies against off-label use is prior authorization."88 Off-label use is the 
practice of physicians prescribing approved medications for other than 
their intended indications.89 Thus, interpreting the prior authorization 
provision to apply only to the prevention of off-label use serves to fur­
ther the statute's purpose within the existing legal landscape of the 
early 1990s. Moreover, the use of prior authorization in the context of 
limiting off-label prescription - a practice that can lead to unneces­
sary over-prescription - fits harmoniously with the legislative his­
tory.90 This legal landscape created by the states in the early 1990s 
provides a greater context in ascertaining the statute's true purposes. 
This contextual framework, coupled with the legislative history, sug­
gests the purpose behind the prior authorization was to reduce unnec­
essary and inefficient over-prescription by curbing off-label use. 
Finally, proposed regulations by the HCFA, the agency that once 
administered Medicaid,91 further paint a picture of the legislative land­
scape in conformity with the prior state enactments and legislative his­
tory. The HCF A failed to issue formal regulations regarding prior 
authorization.92 Yet the proposed regulations that the HFCA promul­
gated indicate that prior authorization should only be used to curb un­
necessary prescription, not to limit coverage.93 As such, the proposed 
regulations by the HFCA support the idea that the Maine Program 
should be preempted as it conflicts with federal law.94 
In light of this legislative history and legal landscape, the First 
Circuit failed to recognize the intent underlying prior authorization. 
The First Circuit, in assessing the Maine Rx Program, argued that the 
88. Robert J. Buchanan & Scott R. Smith, Medicaid Policies for HIV-Related Prescrip­
tion Drugs, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spring 1994, at 43, 57. 
89. MEDICINENET, INC., MEDTERMS DICTIONARY (2002), at http://www.medterms 
.com (last visited Aug. 23, 2002); see, e.g. , infra note 90. 
90. An example of the use of prior authorization as a method for controlling unneces­
sary prescription of off-label drugs is as follows: "state X" places minoxidil on its Medicaid 
formulary for the treatment of hypertension. Doctors in "state X" begin prescribing minoxi­
dil off-label in order to treat hair loss. "State X" subjects minoxidil to prior authorization in 
order to curb this off-label prescription which it believes to be unnecessary and uneconom­
ical in light of the allocation of funds for the most important drugs. 
91. See Abigail B. Pancoast, Comment, A Test Case for Re-evaluation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: The Maine Rx Program, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 184, 190 (2001). HCFA, as 
of July 1, 2001, no longer exists. HCFA is now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Serv­
ices. See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, at http://cms.hhs.gov/about/default.asp 
(last visited July 31, 2002). 
92. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., No. 00-
157-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *20 n.12 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000); Pancoast, supra 
note 91 , at 190. 
93. See Medicaid Program; Payment for Covered Outpatient Drugs Under Drug Rebate 
Agreements with Manufacturers, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,442, 48,454 (Sept. 19, 1995) (to be codified 
at 42 C.F.R. pts. 441 and 447) (noting that states should be prevented from "using a prior 
authorization program as a proxy for a closed formulary"). 
94. See Pancoast, supra note 91, at 190. 
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Maine statute permissibly utilized prior authorization by noting that 
the federal text explicitly allowed for prior authorization and that, ab­
sent any textual proof to the contrary, deference must be given to the 
Maine Department of Human Services' application of the provision.95 
The First Circuit's decision is flawed in two respects. 
First, that court used a strictly textual approach in examining the 
preemption question and therefore ignored Congress's true purposes. 
As noted above, the legislative history, the proposed HCFA regula­
tions, and state laws established post-enactment demonstrate the nar­
row intentions that Congress had for prior authorization.96 The First 
Circuit, however, ignored the legal context and instead used the si­
lence of the text to make the bold conclusion that it was "not con­
vinced that the Medicaid statute is concerned with the motivation be­
hind imposing prior authorization."97 The implication of this statement 
is potentially disastrous. As the District Court below argued, "If 
Maine can use its authority over Medicaid authorization to leverage 
drug manufacturer rebates for the benefit of uninsured citizens, then it 
can just as easily put the rebates into a state program for highway and 
bridge construction or school funding."98 The First Circuit briefly, but 
insufficiently, responded to this argument, noting that highway con­
struction and school funding are unrelated to providing medical serv­
ices and, therefore, could not be justified.99 This response is insuffi­
cient because the crux of the District Court's argument deals not with 
the latter part of its statement - the use of funds for highways and 
schools - but the former - the use of prior authorization as a lever­
age device. Because the First Circuit already indicated that the moti­
vations behind prior authorization are not of concern,100 presumably a 
state could implement a program as a leverage device against doctors, 
or as a tool to reduce Medicaid spending at the expense of the poor, or 
for any other purpose it so desired. Moreover, in addressing the latter 
part of the District Court's argµment, if the First Circuit only limited 
the use of the rebate monies to providing medical services to the 
needy, states still could potentially leverage drug manufacturers and 
use the funds not for highways but for the construction of county hos­
pitals or other medically-related self-dealing. This certainly was not 
the vision that Congress had for prior authorization.101 
95. Phann. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 75 (1st Cir. 2001). 
96. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. 
97. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 76. 
98. Commissioner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *20. 
99. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 77. 
100. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
101. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
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Second, the First Circuit's decision is incomplete in that it failed to 
find preemption of the state statute based on the law's conflict with 
Medicaid's requirement that health care be in the "best interests" of 
the program.102 Prior authorization as implemented by Maine runs 
contrary to the Medicaid provision that any state restriction on drug 
distribution "provide such safeguards as may be necessary to assure 
that . . .  care and services . . . will be provided, in a manner consistent 
with . . .  the best interests of [Medicaid] requirements."103 The Maine 
Program harms Maine recipients by impeding their access to their doc­
tors' first-choice medications and, therefore, runs opposite to the best 
interests of providing medically necessary services to the poor. '04 The 
First Circuit did not reject this argument and only ruled against 
PhRMA on this point because of PhRMA's inability to sustain its bur­
den on this facial challenge.105 Rather, the First Circuit voiced its con­
cern in stating: "Since both sides agree that the prior authorization re­
quirement is the 'hammer' or 'force' that coerces manufacturers to 
enter into the Program, the possibility that first-choice drugs will not 
be readily approved where second-choice inferior alternatives exist 
concerns us."106 The District Court stated that the best interests of the 
patient would be hurt by prior authorization and it would therefore 
defeat the fundamental purposes of Medicaid law.107 There was testi­
mony on the record that when prior authorization is used inappropri­
ately, patients are hurt by increased delays, anxiety and confusion, and 
by the potential prescription of less safe and efficacious drugs.108 Fur­
thermore, although little empirical study has been done on the effects 
of prior authorization, existing empirical data strongly support 
PhRMA's argument.")9 Taken together, all these factors demonstrate 
the high likelihood that the Maine statute's use of prior authorization 
102. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 78. 
103. 42 U.S.C.A. 1396c(a)(19) (West 2000). 
104. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 77. In addition to the obstacles in. receiving first-choice 
medication, the state prior authorization statutes harm Medicaid recipients in the long run in 
the form of research and development losses incurred by pharmaceutical companies. This 
further compounds the state statutes' conflict with the Medicaid program's "best interests" 
requirement. See infra Section Il.B. 
105. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 78. 
106. Id. 
107. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., No. 00-
157-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *19-20 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000). 
108. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 77-78 (quoting the testimony of Dr. Scott Howell). 
109. See Walter E. Smalley et al., Effect of a Prior-Authorization Requirement on the 
Use of Nonsteroidal Antiinf/ammatory Drugs by Medicaid Patients, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1612, 1614 (1995). The study examined NSAIDs that did not have a generic equivalent and 
were subject to prior authorization. Id. The study found that during the two years after prior 
authorization began, total expenditures for NSAIDs fell by $12.8 million compared to pro­
jections. Id. In addition, the study found no evidence of an increase in other related services 
and drugs. Id. 
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undermines Congress's explicit purposes of safeguarding the best in­
terests of the Medicaid program and its patients. 1 1° 
This Section has demonstrated that under a purposive paradigm, 
with a view of the legislative history and circumstances in the states 
subsequent to enactment, Congress meant prior authorization to be 
used only in limited circumstances. 1 1 1  The First Circuit, using a textual 
approach, failed to identify the limited purposes of the prior authori­
zation statute, and also failed to interpret the statute properly in order 
to harmonize it with the best interest requirement which undergirds 
the federal statute.1 12 Taking these factors into account, the Maine 
Program stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the aforemen­
tioned congressional purposes and therefore must be preempted. 
This Section has shown that the purposive approach is superior to 
the textual framework in the context of Medicaid preemption because 
of the increased role of the judiciary in safeguarding the federalism 
concerns inherent in the statute. Under this purposive paradigm, the 
Maine Program must be preempted in light of the legislative history 
and subsequent state enactment reflecting the narrow purposes found 
in that legislative history. Pursuant to the congressional purposes, 
prior authorization does not stand as a leverage device used to extract 
rebates from pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, its misapplication 
stands as an obstacle to Congress's purposes and Medicaid's best in­
terest purposes. 
B. A Delicate Balance Undone: The lmpermissibility 
of Cost Over Access 
"All interpretive theories must ultimately be grounded in a politi­
cal theory and a theory of law."m The notion of a purposivist frame­
work operating in a political vacuum is therefore both unrealistic and 
impossible. The appropriate political theory often depends on the na­
ture of the law at stake. In analyzing Medicaid, courts should adopt a 
delicate balance political theory because of the nature of the Medicaid 
program and because such a theory creates appropriate outer bounda­
ries to the purposive paradigm. Further, under a delicate balance the­
ory of law, the state prior authorization statutes must be preempted 
because they effectively unravel careful compromises over cost and 
access embodied in the legislation. 
110. See H.R. REP. No.101-881 (1992), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.N. 2017 ("[T)he 
Committee does not intend that States establish or implement prior authorization controls 
that have the effect of preventing competent physicians from prescribing in accordance with 
their medical judgment."). 
111. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra notes 101 -109 and accompanying text. 
113. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 31. 
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The delicate balance theory rests upon the idea that legislation is a 
package of compromises between various groups, and states should 
not be allowed to upset the political decisions made by Congress in ac­
commodating competing interests and interest groups.114 The case of 
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette115 illustrates this theory. The Court 
in Ouellette first noted that a "state law also is pre-empted if it inter­
feres with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to 
reach this goal."116 The Clean Water Act, the law at issue in Ouellette, 
carefully balanced public and private interests in attempting to elimi­
nate water pollution.117 The Court held that the Vermont law allowing 
common-law suits would upset this carefully crafted balance of inter­
ests at the federal level and therefore must be preempted.118 Thus, the 
Court recognized the balanced nature of the statute and deferred ac­
cordingly to that balance. 
Three reasons demonstrate why this political theory is so attractive 
in the present case. First, Medicaid, much like the Clean Water Act, is 
a program that balances interests of different groups - doctors, re­
cipients, and pharmaceutical manufacturers - and balances compet­
ing goals - accessibility and cost-effectiveness.119 For exampl�, the 
federal rebate requirement serves as a quid pro quo to balance the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers' open access to state formularies, i.e., 
states' lists of covered drugs - an arrangement that protects and pre­
serves the interests of manufacturers, patients, and both federal and 
114. Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 69, 77-79 (1988). 
115. 479 U.S. 481 (1987). For other examples of delicate balance theory, see City of 
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 169 (1963) (White, J., dissenting); Paul W. Kahn, The 
Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 
YALE L.J. 1 (1987). For an example of the theory in the food and drug setting, see Schering 
Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 51 F.3d 390, 396 (3d Cir. 1995). 
116. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494. 
117. Id. at 494. 
118. Id. at 497 ("The CWA carefully defines the role of both the source and affected 
States, and specifically provides for a process whereby their interests will be considered and 
balanced by the source State and the EPA. This delineation of authority represents Con­
gress' considered judgment as to the best method of serving the public interest and recon­
ciling the often-competing concerns of those affected by the 'pollution. It would be extraor­
dinary for Congress, after devising an elaborate permit system that sets clear standards, to 
tolerate common-law suits that have the potential to undermine this regulatory structure."). 
119. See generally GILMAN, supra note 65 (discussing the twin goals of (:Ontrolling ex­
penditures and providing the best care); MEDICAID REFORM AND THE AMERICAN STATES 
(Mark R. Daniels ed., 1998) (same); REMAKING MEDICAID: MANAGED CARE FOR THE 
PUBLIC GOOD, at xiv (Stephen M. Davidson & Stephen A. Somers eds., 1998) (same). For a 
description of the competing interests inherent in Medicaid's comparable sister program, 
Medicare, see Massachusetts Medical Society v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1987). 
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state governments.120 Medicaid epitomizes the delicate balance theory 
of legislation. 
Second, delicate balance theory guides courts in dealing with diffi­
cult issues of federalism in an area of complex federal/state relations. 
For example, in the case of Medicaid, the political history of the pro­
gram demonstrates the federal government's controlling position vis­
a-vis the states, thereby providing courts with the clear message that 
the federal balance of interests should be upheld.121 In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the federal government began to exert greater control 
in Medicaid and treat the states not as co-equals, but as subordinates 
to be commanded.122 In describing the Medicaid program as an exam­
ple of this new change in federal/state relations, one scholar notes: 
"Instead of relying upon the carrot of federal grants and conditions-of­
aid to gain state cooperation, the federal government has relied in­
creasingly upon sticks of various sorts, including legislative regulation, 
preemption, and judicial decrees."123 Even when Congress did give 
discretion to the states during this time, it did so in many cases with 
instructions of great specificity.124 If Congress demanded to be in the 
driver's seat in the promulgation of Medicaid requirements, then pre­
sumably it would also not want those provisions reflecting a delicate 
balance to be subverted by the states. Deference to federal interests 
via the delicate balance theory therefore recognizes Congress's intent 
to retain greater control in the realm of Medicaid. 
Third, the delicate balance theory provides outer limits to protect 
against judicial lawmaking. The theory is based on the idea of law that 
the legislature forms legislation as a package of compromises and that 
the judiciary cannot interfere to destroy the package.125 Thus, the deli­
cate balance theory used in conjunction with purposivism serves as a 
balance within the jurisprudence. The purposivist judge proactively 
searches for statutory intent, yet the limits of the delicate balance 
theory prevent excessive judicial overreaching and the destruction of 
legislative will.126 The p.urposivist court looks to the purposes of the 
law, and if it sees legislation that seems to be indicative of a delicate 
balance, then it defers to that balance. Therefore, a delicate balance 
120. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and Other Relief at para. 1 7, Pharm. 
Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Meadows (N.D. Fla. 2001 ) (4:01CV356-ws). 
121.  GILMAN, supra note 65, at 105. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 1 1 5. 
125. Wolfson, supra note 114, at 77. 
1 26. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 27 (noting that the objective of archeological mod­
els of interpretation is legislative supremacy); Jordan, supra note 39, at 1216-17 (recognizing 
that purposivism, as well as textualism, is wholly committed to the idea of legislative su­
premacy). 
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theory may provide sound guidance for the purposivist judge who 
seeks to fulfill her role in safeguarding federalism while stopping short 
of legislating from the bench. Thus, the nature of the Medicaid pro­
gram, the creation of outer limits to prevent against judicial lawmak­
ing, and a recognition of Congress's purposeful superiority over the 
states in Medicaid all support the utilization of a delicate balance the­
ory in assessing a Medicaid preemption conflict. 
Some opponents of the delicate balance theory, however, argue 
that it overlooks the fundamental premise of federalism that holds 
that there are two levels of legislative activity: federal and state.127 
These critics continue by noting that a delicate balance theory does 
not necessarily evince an intent by Congress to preclude the states 
from altering the balance at their legislative level.128 If states were pre­
cluded from acting, the opponents argue, then "there would seem to 
be little if any room for state regulatory authority."129 The slippery 
slope is wet with the fear that the delicate balance theory may lead to 
the extreme centralization of government. Although a valid concern in 
the field of Medicaid, there are two responses to this contention. 
First, the delicate balance theory would only preclude states from 
acting and upsetting federal interests where the legislation 
demonstrates a multi-interest, compromise nature. If states were 
allowed to subvert the balance in these types of laws, then there would 
be no reason for Congress to strike the balance in the first place.130 
One could easily envision Congress washing its hands of formulating 
any legislation that involved a complex network of interests. Programs 
like Medicaid and the Clean Water Act would be subject to a patch­
work of varying state visions, and the uniformity found within these 
programs would be lost. 
In addition, the theory would only amount to "minifield" preemp­
tion where Congress marks out a small part of a piece of legislation 
that represents a delicate balance and cannot be upset.131 For example, 
a court could conclude in the case of Medicaid that the provisions re­
lating to rebates and prior authorization132 represent a minifield that 
Congress completely occupies due to the balance of interests found in 
those subsections. Thus the states would be preempted from entering 
that field and changing those provisions. States would not be pre­
cluded from the whole field of Medicaid and the delicate balance con-
127. Wolfson, supra note 114, at 81-82. 
128. Id. 
129. KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION: A REPORT OF THE 
APPELLATE JUDGES CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 36 (1991). 
130. Wolfson, supra note 114, at 82. 
131. Id. 
132. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396r-8(c)-(d) {West 2000). 
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sequently would work hand-in-hand with the management of federal­
ism. 
In applying the delicate balance theory to the state prior authoriza­
tion statutes at issue, it becomes clear that the state laws upset the bal­
ance struck by Congress between accessibility of drugs provided by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and cost-effectiveness realized by the 
states. By linking prior authorization to extracting supplemental re­
bates from pharmaceutical companies, states impermissibly decrease 
access to drugs and subvert the balance between access and expense 
mandated to the states in 1990. The mandatory rebates in the Medi­
caid statute were originally part of private voluntary pharmaceutical 
programs between pharmaceutical manufacturers and states.133 After 
many, but not all, states adopted the private program, Congress man­
dated in its Medicaid legislation that all fifty states adopt this program 
and thereby increase access to medicines through these rebates.134 
Congress's incorporation of an originally voluntary state program into 
its federal law as a required program makes one thing clear: the 
method of rebating in order to improve access to prescription drugs is 
not optional. 
When states leverage supplemental rebates out of drug companies 
by utilizing the threat of prior authorization, these states effectively 
turn a congressional mandate into something entirely discretionary. 
States could require exorbitant supplemental rebate amounts for cer­
tain drugs in order to limit access purposefully through the deterrent 
of prior authorization and thereby cut costs. The delicate balance be­
tween cost and access, consequently, would be destroyed. In order to 
maintain the delicate balance of interests in the federal legislation, the 
state prior authorization statutes must be preempted as running con­
trary to the purpose of Congress in tempering cost and open access to 
necessary prescription drugs for the poor. 
Medicaid embodies a delicate balance of interests, and the state 
prior authorization statutes must be preempted in order to preserve 
that balance. As the First Circuit noted, "federal preemption of a state 
law is strong medicine, and is not casually to be dispensed."135 Al­
though the medicine is strong, it is clearly warranted in the present 
case. By using a purposive interpretive paradigm that is founded upon 
a delicate balance political theory, these state statutes must be deemed 
to be in implied conflict with Congress's purposes, and consequently 
preempted. Maine and several other states turned the rebate and prior 
authorization provisions in the federal law on their head. Congress, 
133. R. Roy Vagelos, Are Prescription Drug Prices High?, 252 SCIENCE, 1080, 1083-1084 
(1991) (describing Merck's "Equal Access to Medicines Program"). 
134. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(a)-(c) (West 2000); see Vagelos, supra note 133, at 1084. 
135. Concannon, supra note 15, at 75 (internal quotations omitted). 
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however, never intended prior authorization to be used as a bargain­
ing device to subvert the balanced interests in the legislation. 
II. A SLEEPING GIANT A WAKENS: THE DORMANT COMMERCE 
CLAUSE AND THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION 
STATUTES 
Resolution of the preemption question does not foreclose the con­
stitutional dilemma associated with prior authorization. Although pre­
emption remains dispositive, alternative grounds of attack remain in 
the form of the dormant commerce clause. A court managing to 
squirm around the preemptive qualities of the prior authorization 
statutes must still cross through the constitutional quagmire of the 
dormant commerce clause. This Part argues that such a task is impos­
sible because the state statutes clearly run afoul of the dormant com­
merce clause. Section II.A paves the way for the dormant commerce 
clause analysis by dismissing market participation as a viable defense 
for a state seeking refuge from a barrage of Commerce Clause attacks. 
Section II.B proceeds to argue that the state prior authorization stat­
utes are per se unconstitutional because they have an extraterritorial 
reach. Section II.C then argues in the alternative that even if the stat­
utes are upheld under an extraterritoriality test, they must be struck 
down under a balancing test since the burdens on interstate commerce 
outweigh the local benefits of the statutes. 
A. A Word on Market Participation: The Easy Case 
If a state is acting as a participant in the market and not as a regu­
lator, it may discriminate against out-of-state interests and be free 
from the constraints of the dormant commerce clause.136 The distinc­
tion between a regulator and a participant is often unclear;137 never­
theless, it is imperative to understand those differences in the present 
case to fully address the salient dormant commerce clause attacks. The 
case of the state prior authorization statutes, however, is an easy one. 
With regard to these statutes, the distinction is clear: the states' regula­
tion of drug prices through rebate provisions is an act of market regu­
lation and not market participation. Therefore, the states are not ex­
empt from dormant commerce clause violation. 
Both the District Court of Maine's and the First Circuit's analysis 
on this point is instructive. Both courts held that under the Maine 
statute, Maine was acting as a market regulator. The market partici-
136. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. , 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976); see also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 336 (1997). 
137. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 337-38. 
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pant doctrine governs the specific transaction.138 Under the Maine 
Program, it is the citizen who transacts and is considered the "payor" 
for the pharmaceuticals - the state of Maine never buys the prescrip­
tion drugs.139 The state is merely using its regulatory power in order to 
achieve the specific social goal of price reduction for its citizens.140 This 
is market regulation and not participation.141 Consequently, any de­
fense a state may raise through the invocation of the market partici­
pant doctrine must necessarily fail. The state prior authorization stat­
utes - Maine's being most illustrative - are a clear exercise of states' 
regulatory power. The dormant commerce clause's restrictions still 
apply and therefore extraterritoriality and balancing must still be ad­
dressed in turn. 
B. Extraterritoriality and the Prohibition Against Legislative 
Projection 
"For the most part, states may not legislate extraterritorially, 
whatever exactly that means."142 This purposefully ambiguous state­
ment, according to Professor Donald Regan, defines the principle of 
extraterritoriality.143 The opaque gloss of Regan's definition perhaps 
most vividly reflects the confusion both in the constitutional grounding 
of the principle and its line of jurisprudence.144 Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court has considered extraterritoriality a subject of dormant 
138. Phann. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., No. 00-
157-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *11 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000). 
139. Phann. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 80 (1st Cir. 2001). 
140. Commissioner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *11. 
141. In fact, Maine looked into becoming a bulk purchaser of pharmaceuticals, but de­
cided against it presumably due to budgetary constraints. See OFFICE OF POLICY AND 
LEGAL ANALYSIS, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMM'N TO STUDY BULK PURCHASING FOR 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THE JOINT STANDING COMM. ON 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 199th Leg. 1st Sess., at 3, 19 (Me. 1999); Whitney M. 
Phelps, Comment, Maine's Prescription Drug Plan, A Look into The Controversy, 65 ALB. 
L. REV. 243, 260 (2001). Thus, Maine's consideration of bulk purchasing is telling insofar as 
it demonstrates the conscious decision of the state to forgo participation in favor of regula­
tion. 
142. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America 
and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (ll) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. 
REV. 1865, 1896 (1987) [hereinafter Regan, Siamese Essays]. 
143. Id. 
144. The confusion abounds: whether or not extraterritoriality is a subject of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, see Regan, supra note 42, at 1280; Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 
142, at 1894, whether or not balancing and extraterritoriality are mutually exclusive, see 
Edgar v. MITE Corp. , 457 U.S. 624, 640-46 (1982); supra note 44 (listing cases), and whether 
or not extraterritoriality is grounded in due process, see, e.g. , Robert H. Abrams & Paul R. 
Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. 
L. REV. 75, 76-83 {1984). 
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commerce clause jurisprudence145 and has declared that a state may 
not regulate commerce "that takes place wholly outside of the State's 
borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State."146 
Thus, if a state projects its own legislation onto the regulatory schemes 
of other states, the statute is extraterritorial and per se unconstitu­
tional.147 
The principle of extraterritoriality comes to the forefront in the is­
sue of state prior authorization statutes. PhRMA argued and lost its 
extraterritorial challenge to the Maine Program before the First 
Circuit.148 Under closer inspection of the First Circuit's analysis, how­
ever, the court misapplied the principles of extraterritorialism. This 
Section critically examines the First Circuit's opinion and concludes 
that the Maine Program is unconstitutional under an extraterritorial 
Commerce Clause query. This Section begins by advancing the princi­
pal argument that the Maine Program impermissibly regulates conduct 
between pharmaceutical manufacturers and out-of-state wholesalers. 
Once the foundational argument is established, this Section then rec­
ognizes three justifications for upholding the Maine Program on extra­
territorial grounds and in turn refutes each of these justifications as 
being a misapplication of constitutional principles. 
The state prior authorization statutes are unconstitutionally extra­
territorial because they regulate transactions that occur between out­
of-state manufacturers and out-of-state wholesalers. The state of 
Maine houses no drug manufacturers.149 Similarly, the vast majority of 
wholesalers - with only three exceptions - are located out-of­
state.150 The Maine Program, by "forcing" rebates upon manufacturers 
through the threat of prior authorization, in effect regulates the prices 
that these complying manufacturers charge their out-of-state whole-
145. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86-88 (1987). But see Regan, 
supra note 42, at 1280 (arguing that the extraterritorial principle is not a Commerce Clause 
principle). 
146. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642-43. 
147. ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 174 (1997) (stating that a state cannot enact "leg­
islation that has the practical effect of exporting that state's domestic policies"). 
148. Pharrn. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 82 (1st Cir. 2001) 
("Because the regulation only applies to in-state activities, there is no extraterritorial reach 
and the Act is not per se invalid under the Commerce Clause."). 
149. Pharrn. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., No. 00-
1 57-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *13 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000). 
150. Id. at *5-6. ("There are limited exceptions. Hannaford Bros. Co., located in Maine, 
buys directly from Roxane Laboratories, Inc. and Boehringer Ingleheim Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.; Bindley Western Drug Company, a distributor, has a subsidiary, J.E. Goold, that is lo­
cated in Maine; and Progressive Distributors, . Inc., another distributor, has a facility in 
Maine . . . .  Under the contracts with these companies, however, the sale from the manufac­
turer always occurs at the place of business outside Maine - with the exception of 
Hannaford Bros. Co. In other words, Bindley Western and Progressive Distributors go to 
other states to buy their products, then import them into Maine."). 
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sale buyers.151 As the District Court declared, "Maine may have power 
over what pharmacists later do here in Maine, or over the few distribu­
tors who transact business in Maine, but it has no power to regulate 
the prices paid earlier in transactions in other states."152 The "practical 
effect"153 of the rebate is clear: manufacturers must sell their drugs at 
lower prices to wholesalers in order for those wholesalers to sell the 
prescription drugs in Maine at the rebated price level.154 Because these 
wholesalers and manufacturers all reside outside of Maine's borders, 
the Maine Program is entirely extraterritorial in its reach and there­
fore unconstitutional.155 
Three major counter-arguments, however, can be raised in an at­
tempt to uphold the statute on extraterritorial grounds. First, the 
Maine Program constitutionally regulates extraterritorial conduct be­
cause it does so by indirect means. Second, one can distinguish the 
primary extraterritorial cases as dealing with price control statutes, 
whereas the Maine Program is not a price control. Third, the rebate 
agreement in the Maine Program is voluntary and therefore the manu­
facturers are free to not participate and not be bound extraterritoriar­
ally. The First Circuit upheld the statute on extraterritorial grounds 
under these three justifications.156 Although all valid arguments, they 
are ultimately unpersuasive and will be refuted in tum. 
First, the First Circuit argued that an indirect regulation of out-of­
state transactions does not violate the constitutional principle of extra­
territoriality. The First Circuit upheld the Maine Program because the 
Maine Program regulated out-of-state transactions in an indirect man­
ner. The court stated: "[T]he Maine Act does not impose direct con-
151. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 78 ("[T]he prior authorization requirement is the 'hammer' 
or 'force' that coerces manufacturers to enter into the Program . . . .  "). 
152. Commissioner, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17363, at *14. 
153. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989) (stating that a "state law that has the 
'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State's borders is in­
valid under the Commerce Clause"). 
154. This practical effect becomes more apparent given the fact that the rebate prices 
are below the pre-rebate wholesale prices, and thus manufacturers necessarily lose profits 
due to the adjustment of wholesale prices. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (dis­
cussing Maine's coercive tactics leading to lost profits). 
155. The extraterritorial reach of the statute only applies to those transactions between 
out-of-state manufacturers and out-of-state wholesalers. Therefore, Maine still can constitu­
tionally regulate the limited number of transactions that involve one or more of the state's 
few wholesalers. Of course, Part I of this Note argues that such regulations would be invali­
dated on preemption grounds. 
If Maine had any in-state manufacturers, the analysis potentially becomes a bit more 
complex. The physical location of the transaction - whether the sale occurred in the state of 
Maine or out-of-state - would determine constitutionality under the dormant commerce 
clause. The complexity arises in determining the exact location of transaction. See CTS Corp. 
v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 142, at 
1 874. 
156. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 81-82. 
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trols on a transaction that occurs wholly out-of-state."157 The di­
rect/indirect rule states that a direct regulation is generally held to be 
per se unconstitutional whereas an indirect regulation is subject to a 
lower level of scrutiny via a balancing test. 158 Because the Maine Pro­
gram only regulates the out-of-state transactions between manufactur­
ers and wholesalers indirectly via the rebate provision, the law is not 
per se invalid. Although this probably was the First Circuit's strongest 
ground for upholding the statute, two arguments refute the primacy of 
the indirect/direct distinction. 
Indirectness is not dispositive of extraterritorial scrutiny as it is 
only one of three major principles that govern extraterritorial analy­
sis.159 Only the second principle - "a statute that directly controls 
commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State . . .  is in­
valid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was in­
tended by the legislature"160 - makes reference to a direct control. 
The second principle also seems mostly to address motive review and 
the fact that a direct control would be subject to strict scrutiny even if 
legislative motive was pure. Furthermore, the first principle dealing 
with price scales (and not mentioning directness) seems most relevant 
to the Maine rebate statute at hand. Directness maintains a small 
place in the jurisprudence, but its primacy over the other principles 
and its use as a criterion for heightened scrutiny is unclear.161 From the 
explication of the other principles making no reference to directness, 
the inference is drawn that the strict scrutiny of extraterritorially does 
not depend upon the directness of the regulation, and alternative 
grounds exist to justify an indirect regulation. 
Additionally, any direct/indirect test is mechanical and often re­
sults in inconsequential and arbitrary results.162 The key in extraterri-
157. Id. at 82. 
158. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 
(1986). 
159. As the Court in Healy posited, the extraterritorial cases stand for three principles: 
"First, the Commerce Clause . . .  precludes the application of a state statute to commerce 
that takes place wholly outside the State's borders . . .  specifically, a State may not adopt 
legislation that has the practical effect of establishing a scale of prices for use in other 
states . . . .  Second, a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the 
boundaries of a State . . .  is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach 
was intended by the legislature . . . .  Third, the practical effect of the statute must be evalu­
ated . . .  by considering how the challenged statute may interact with the regulatory regimes 
of other States . . . .  " Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (internal citations omit­
ted). 
160. Id. 
161. See Daniel M. Forman, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Massa­
chusetts Landfill Moratorium: Are National Market Principles Adequately Served?, 24 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 425, 435 (1997). 
162. Mark P. Gergen, Territoriality and the Perils of Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1735, 
1737-38 (1988). 
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torial cases is the fact that the state is projecting its regulatory scheme 
onto transactions outside of its boundaries. The direct/indirect distinc­
tion misses the point. In the case of the Maine Program, Maine does 
not deny that the practical effect of the statute is to reduce the prices 
of the drugs that out-of-state manufacturers sell to out-of-state dis­
tributors. The means of doing this - whether through direct regula­
tion of that transaction or through an indirect rebate affecting the 
eventual prices of the Medicaid drugs sold in Maine - are irrelevant. 
The means are irrelevant because the state will reach its end regard­
less of the directness of . the means.163 In fact, subverting principles of 
state interest for a mechanical directness test may undermine the very 
ideals of state sovereignty that extraterritorialism seeks to protect.164 
The bottom line of extraterritorialism is not directness, but practical 
effects. As the Supreme Court has reasoned, "the critical considera­
tion in determining whether the extraterritorial reach of a statute vio­
lates the Commerce Clause is the overall effect of the statute on both 
local and interstate commerce."165 The effects of a statute on state sov­
ereignty and national economy166 must have primacy over the me­
chanics and perversities of directness. 
The second major justification for upholding the Maine Program is 
that the case law governing extraterritoriality deals with the impermis­
sibility of price controls and price affirmations.167 The First Circuit jus­
tified the statute by distinguishing the three cases that PhRMA relied 
upon168 as being cases about price affirmation and control and there­
fore unrelated to the Maine statute which "does not regulate the price 
of any out-of-state transaction, either by its express terms or by its in­
evitable effect."169 As opposed to the price control cases, Maine does 
not fix the prices of goods sold out-of-state and therefore does not af­
fect the commerce of its sister states.170 
The problem with the First Circuit's treatment of the cases cited by 
PhRMA is that the distinction that the court drew is irrelevant. The 
First Circuit stressed that the Maine Program does not regulate the 
163. Id. at 1737. 
164. Id. at 1740. 
165. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 n.14 (1989). 
166. Id. at 335-36 (recognizing the special concerns governing extraterritoriality of na­
tional economic union and state autonomy). 
167. For an excellent discussion of the economics of price controls, see JOHN KENNETH 
GALBRAITH, A THEORY OF PRICE CONTROL (1980). 
168. PhRMA relied upon Healy, 491 U.S. at 324, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New 
York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986), and Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 
(1935). 
169. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 81 (1st Cir. 2001). 
170. See Phelps, supra note 141, at 265. 
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sale of drugs by manufacturers to wholesalers at a certain price.171 The 
crux of the argument is that in the case of explicit price affirmation 
and price controls, prices are pre-determined either at a fixed amount 
or against a fixed benchmark. This is not the case with regard to the 
Maine Program. Nonetheless, the First Circuit never elaborated why 
such a distinction is relevant, or why the price needs to be bench­
marked to a specific price in order to be extraterritorial. 
In fact, the Maine rebate operates exactly as a price control. For 
example, if a manufacturer agrees to rebate its drug by ten percent, 
the inevitable effect is a ten percent reduction in the price paid to the 
manufacturer by the out-of-state wholesaler .given the reasonable as­
sumption that the wholesaler wants to maintain its profit margin.172 
The First Circuit noted that the Maine law, unlike the affirmation and 
control statutes, does not tie the price of its in-state products to out-of­
state prices.173 But that is exactly what the statute does - it makes out­
of-state prices dependent on the in-state rebated sales. The First 
Circuit began its analysis by stating that the Maine Program does not 
regulate prices "either by its express terms or by its inevitable 
effect. "174 Yet the court glossed over the fact that the Maine Program, 
in effect, is a price control. Thus, its treatment of the price affirmation 
and control cases vis-a-vis the Maine Program was misguided. 
The third major justification for upholding the statute deals with 
the voluntary and non-mutual nature of the rebate agreement. The 
First Circuit disposed of the extraterritorial challenge .on the grounds 
that the rebate agreement is voluntary and a decision to be bound by it 
is made freely by the manufacturer.175 The court went on to note that a 
manufacturer's choice to engage in the rebates and lose profits is not 
an extraterritorial regulation of profits, but rather a decision made by 
the manufacturer itself.176 The court did, however, recognize that the 
manufacturer's freedom of choice may become coercive depending 
upon the negotiation tactics used by the commissioner in extracting 
171. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 81-82. 
172. In other words, regulation of the final price in the sale by the wholesaler to the re­
tailer/recipients (a rebate under the Maine Program) will affect the price in the prior transac­
tion between manufacturer and wholesaler given the assumption that the wholesaler seeks to 
maintain present profit margin. In this way there is a relationship between both transactions. 
See generally RONALD S. BURT, CORPORATE PROFITS AND COOPTATION: NETWORKS OF 
MARKET CONSTRAINTS AND DIRECTORATE TIES IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 9 (1983) 
(describing the relational patterns and interdependencies of transactions and pricing in the 
market). 
173. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 82. 
174. Id. at 81. 
175. Id. at 82 ("The rebate program is voluntary and either the manufacturer or the 
State may withdraw at any time with sixty days' notice."). 
176. Id. 
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rebates and therefore the issue could be revisited subsequent to im­
plementation. 177 
This "voluntary rationale" once again is a misapplication of consti­
tutional principle. Whether the choice to be bound to the statute is en­
tirely voluntary is not of consequence in assessing extraterritoriality. 
The freedom of choice or lack thereof to be bound by extraterritorial 
legislation does not in itself provide independent grounds for the con­
ferral of extraterritorial jurisdiction.178 Thus, something is impermissi­
bly extraterritorial regardless of the mutuality of the party of con­
cern.179 The First Circuit failed to realize this point.180 
In addition, the First Circuit's voluntary rationale - specifically its 
language concerning the voluntary aspects of a manufacturer's deci­
sion to forgo profits - is both overly formalistic and arbitrary. First, 
the court stated that the Maine law in no way regulated profits and 
that such a decision was strictly based on the manufacturer's own voli­
tion. 181 This argument is overly formalistic in that it fails to take into 
account the effect of the rebate - the reduction of the manufacturer's 
profit margin. The court, in this same vein of formalism, attempted to 
justify its position by stating that the statutory language calls for "ne­
gotiating rebates" and not "regulating prices."182 The statute does in 
fact regulate profits, but it does so indirectly through the mechanism 
of the rebate. 
Second, the court's discussion of the regulation of profits reflects 
an arbitrariness and a possible prejudice that drives the entire opinion. 
177. Id. 
178. Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 142, at 1903. Professor Regan's discussion of 
Brown-Forman is instructive. lei. In Brown-Forman, the distiller cooperated in the creation 
of the New York law to be bound extraterritorially and affirm a set price as a quid pro quo 
for being able to do business in New York. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York 
State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 575-76 (1986). The distiller, much like the drug manu­
facturer in the present instance, remained "free" to abide by the price cap or simply to do no 
business in New York. Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 142, at 1903. Regan compares 
Brown-Forman to the hypothetical of "Jones," an Illinois resident, who irrationally swears 
out an affidavit to be bound extraterritorially by Georgia's sodomy law; commits sodomy in 
Illinois in violation of the Georgia law; and then travels to Georgia. Id. at 1904. Georgia 
would not be able to prosecute Jones for something he did in Illinois. Id. Regan, comparing 
"Jones" and Brown-Forman, reaches the quite logical conclusion that "[i]f a free undertak­
ing to be bound by extraterritorial legislation, whether by Jones or by a distiller, does not 
confer extraterritorial jurisdiction, then it seems even clearer that the distiller's actual af­
firmation, which was to some degree compelled by the New York licensing agreements, 
should not grant extraterritorial jurisdiction." Id. 
179. Presumably this would also render the First Circuit's concern for coercion by the 
state commissioner moot. If a law is extraterritorial regardless of the free choice of the chal­
lenging party, then the presence or absence of coercive tactics in no way changes the fact of 
its extraterritoriality. 
180. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 82 (1st Cir. 2001). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
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The court noted that the Commissioner's negotiation may become co­
ercive, and at that point in time, a challenge should be brought.183 Yet 
the court never addressed exactly at what point in time negotiation 
would equal coercion. The court's failure to set an objective standard 
of fairness to measure the level of coercion is potential for an arbitrary 
normative judgment. 
The First Circuit's analysis in its totality perhaps reflects that such 
a standard of fairness will be biased against the pharmaceutical manu­
facturers.184 The court initially glossed over the "inevitable effect" 
principle of the extraterritorial inquiry most likely because it consid­
ered a loss of profits as being a voluntary action completely unrelated 
to the rebates.185 The court then created a formalistic and counter­
intuitive distinction between "negotiating rebates" and "regulating 
profits."186 Finally, the court declared that, at the nebulous point of co­
ercion, the issue of extraterritoriality may be reconsidered again; yet, 
the court never articulated what constitutes such a breaking point.187 
These aspects of the opinion taken together lead to the inference of a 
possible prejudice that- the court may have held against pharmaceuti­
cal companies and the perception that such companies make excessive 
and unwarranted profits. 
The Maine Program extraterritorially projects its regulation onto 
out-of-state transactions. Such a practice runs afoul of fundamental 
dormant commerce clause values. The First Circuit attempted to vali­
date the statute in light of its apparent deficiency · by distinguishing 
away the relevant price control cases, focusing upon the voluntariness 
of the statute, and utilizing the indirectness of the regulation as its 
savings clause. The First Circuit's analysis, however, was misguided. 
The statute is extraterritorial and per se unconstitutional. 
C. Medicaid in the Balance: An Examination of Burdens and 
Benefits 
The present dormant commerce clause inquiry should begii:i and 
end with extraterritoriality. Nevertheless, for the unpersuaded court 
that upholds the prior authorization statutes under an extraterritorial­
ity analysis, a lower level of scrutiny will still suffice to demonstrate a 
183. Id. 
184. The First Circuit's prejudice becomes even more apparent in the context of its bal-
ancing test analysis. See infra notes 237-254 and accompanying text. 
185. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 82 (1st Cir. 2001). 
186. Id. 
187. See id. 
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Commerce Clause violation in the present case.188 Traditionally, a 
court refusing an extraterritorial challenge applies a balancing test to 
the statute at hand.189 Under the balancing test, the statute will be up­
held "unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."190 In the present 
case, even under the lower level of scrutiny of the balancing test, the 
state statutes impose burdens on commerce that outweigh their bene­
fits and are therefore unconstitutional. By first evaluating the per­
ceived benefits of lower prescription drug prices for Medicaid recipi­
ents, such benefits become exposed as de minimus. Moreover, 
understanding that courts must weigh in the balance the loss of profits 
incurred by pharmaceutical manufacturers imposes a significant bur­
den on interstate commerce. Finally, under a Carotene Products analy­
sis,191 the balance must tip in favor of PhRMA because of its potential 
characterization as a group discriminated against in the political proc­
ess. 
The benefit of lower prices to Medicaid recipients through the 
supplemental state rebates is small and should be given little weight in 
the balance. The First Circuit considered lower prices of prescription 
drugs and the consequent increased access to prescription drugs by the 
poor a "substantial" benefit.192 Two primary reasons cut against the 
value of lower prices as a putative local benefit. First, prescription 
drugs account for only ten percent of Medicaid spending.193 Thus, tar­
geting prescription drugs really will not provide substantial benefits 
relative to Medicaid spending in total.194 The degree of the benefit is 
1 88. Because state prior authorization statutes clearly do not discriminate facially 
against out-of-staters, a balancing test, rather than strict scrutiny, applies. See Concannon, 
249 F.3d at 83; Phelps, supra note 1 41 ,  at 262. 
189. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
190. Id. The language "clearly excessive" implies more than a mere mathematical for­
mula, but rather a legal standard conditional on degree. See id. ("If a legitimate local pur­
pose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that 
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on 
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities."). 
191. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co. , 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
192. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 84. 
193. Regional Report, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3385796. 
194. Jonathan L. Mezrich, International Tax Issues of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 
10 AKRON TAX J. 127, 135 n.29 (1993) ("Curiously, many Congressmen fail to appreciate the 
relative insignificance of pharmaceuticals to health care costs . . . .  While a 10% cost (if accu­
rate) is a little more significant, it is still a small puddle in the pond."). It should be noted 
that, although only ten percent of Medicaid spending, pharmaceutical costs still account for a 
considerable amount of money. See Regional Report, supra note 193 ("Collectively states 
spent $21 billion on drugs in the outpatient and managed-care portions of their Medicaid 
programs [in 2000]."). Yet, to reiterate, $21 billion is but a small puddle in the pond of a pro­
gram with gigantic total expenditures. See Leighton Ku & Jocelyn Guyer, Medicaid Spend­
ing: Rising Again, Biil Not to Crisis Levels, Apr. 20, 2001, at http://www.cbpp.org ("Estimates 
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small if one examines the small place of prescription drugs in the gi­
gantic landscape of Medicaid. 
Second, the benefits of lower prices for the poor in the short-run 
may be a burden to these recipients and to consumers at large in the 
long-run. The current federal rebate program is structured to make 
sure manufacturers sell their Medicaid drugs at a minimum of 15.1 % 
off of the manufacturer's average price - with many of the discounts 
exceeding the 15.1 % level.195 This ensures that the manufacturers are 
not overcharging, but rather selling at below-market prices.196 Working 
under this assumption that drug companies are selling their products 
to Medicaid recipients at below-market levels already, by further in­
creasing that discount via state supplemental rebates, drug companies 
will have greater incentive to both decrease sales197 to Medicaid recipi­
ents and slow research and development of life-saving pipeline 
drugs.198 Thus, the price benefit to Medicaid recipients today may pre­
vent them from obtaining the necessary medications of tomorrow. In 
this light, the substantial benefit of lower drug prices loses its value. 
Proponents of state statutes like the Maine's contend that lower 
prices will be off-set by volume increases and thus the effects on re­
search and development are exaggerated and illusory. As a Merrill 
that CBO issued in 1993 projected that the federal government and the states together 
would spend $1.6 trillion on Medicaid from 1994 to 2000."). 
195. Statement of Eli Lilly Spokesperson Gerianne Hap, Aug. 8, 2001 (on file with 
author); see also, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(c) (West 2000). 
196. Pharm. Research & Mfgs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2001)  
(indicating that the rationale for the federal rebate is  one of  cost-reduction and the preven­
tion of above-market prices charged by manufacturers). 
197. A reduction in pharmaceutical sales has a wide-spread adverse effect on both gov­
ernment health care costs as well as costs to consumers. See Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Per­
spective on Pharmaceuticals: A Health-Care Scapegoat Responds; Blaming Drug Companies 
For All Our Ills Harms Research and Ignores the Cost-effectiveness of the Industry, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 9, 1993, at B7; Mezrich, supra note 194, at 135 n.30 (quoting Gerald J. 
Mossinghoff, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association President Testifies on International 
Competitiveness, TAX ANALYSTS TAX NOTES INT'L, July 24, 1991) ("Medicines not only 
save lives - they save money. Medicines are the most cost-effective form of medical therapy 
because they help to reduce the cost of alternative, more expensive forms of medical care, 
such as surgery or hospitalization."); Mezrich, supra note 194, at 135 ("[H)igh pharmaceuti­
cal costs still actually save money, because a good medicine tends to keep patients out of 
hospitals or eliminate the need for surgery or other therapies which may cost much more 
than even the most expensive drug."). 
198. See John E. Calfee, Why Pharmaceutical Price Controls Are Bad for Patients, 
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE: ON THE ISSUES, Mar. 1999, available at 
http://www.aei.org/oti/oti10198.htm ("But prices reflect other costs as well, in particular, the 
costs of research and advertising. Fixing prices at lower levels would inevitably curtail devel­
opment and distribution of new products that improve and extend life."); Peter Ferrera, 
Poor Prescriptions for Health Prospects, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002, at A20, available at 
2002 WL 2916888 (noting that price controls and other market interventions delay research 
and limit access to new drugs and therapies); Leigh Page, Maine Poised to Set Nation's First 
Price Controls on Drugs, Amednews.com, May 8, 2000, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci­
pubs/amnews/pick_OO/bisc0508.html ("Many doctors worry that clamping down on drug 
prices will cut back on funding for pharmaceutical research and development . . . .  "). 
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Lynch report indicated, "Volume increases could overwhelm negative 
pricing impact . . . .  On a worst-case basis we believe the top-line im­
pact could be negative 6 percent if all Medicare recipients had access 
to drugs at a 40 percent discount to the manufacturer's price.m99 At 
only a negative six percent clip, drug manufacturers would not have to 
dip into their research and development funds in order to finance re­
bated sales.200 
This argument, although reassuring in part, fails to recognize that 
the drug industry is a risky, long-term business. Volume increases on 
existing drugs may keep the industry alive, but continuous annual loss 
projections must be accounted for now and affect the development of 
drugs that could potentially reach market years from now.201 By limit­
ing profits of the successful drugs, research and development will nec­
essarily decline.202 The limitation by state rebate statutes, of course, is 
added to the already 15.1 % minimum federal rebate to create an un­
manageable obstacle to research and development.203 One health care 
199. Derrick Z. Jackson, Drug Price Cuts Won't Kill Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 22, 
2000, available at http://www.commondreams.org/views/092300-101.htm (quoting Merril 
Lynch Report, June 23, 1999); see also Jerry Stanton, Comment, Lessons for the United 
States From Foreign Price Controls on Pharmaceuticals, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149, 151-152 
(2000) ("[T]he question remains whether Congress should impose those price controls. Con­
sumers would enjoy the immediate benefit of reduced prices while pharmaceutical firms 
would suffer similar reduced profit margins, although sales volume may increase."). 
200. See Jackson, supra note 199. 
201. C. Daniel Mullins et al., The Impact of Pipeline Drugs on Pharmaceutical Spending, 
CENTER ON DRUGS AND PUBLIC POLICY, U. MD. SCHOOL OF PHARMACY, Apr. 13-14, 
2000, at http://membership.hiaa.org/pdfs/drugsymposium.pdf (noting that consideration of 
pipeline drugs is imperative for understanding and projecting future drug trends and pric­
ing). 
202. JAMES FROGUE, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WHY PRICE CONTROLS ON 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS WOULD HARM SENIORS, Executive Memorandum, May 14, 1999, 
available at http://www.heritage.org/library/execmemo/em595.html; HENRY GRABOWSKI, 
HEALTH REFORM AND PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 19 (1994) (noting that research is 
funded by profits from current sales of those drugs already in the marketplace); Julio 
Nogues, Patents and Pharmace11tical Drugs: Understanding the Pressures on Developing 
Countries, 502 World Bank WPS Paper 18 (Sept. 1990) (indicating that in the United States 
the pharmaceutical industry invests between 16% and 20.8% of its revenue in research and 
development); Pharmaceutical Industry Profile (Phrma), at http://www.phrma.org/ 
publications/industry/pro-file00/chap8nf.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2000) (same); see also 
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Research, Promotion and Profits: Spotlight is on the Drug Industry, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1993, at 1 ("Drug companies undertake these massive searches know­
ing there will be a big payoff if they hit a winner . . . . We can have lower drug prices if we 
accept less of that searching. That's the choice we face."). 
203. The obstacle is unmanageable in spite of claims that pharmaceutical profits are ex­
cessive and can thus overcome price control. See Michael B. Moore, "Open Wide" (Your 
Pocketbook That Isl) - A Call For The Establishment In The United States Of A Prescrip­
tion Drug Price Regulatory Agency, 1 S.w. J. L. & TRADE AM. 149, 149 n.2 (1994) (citing 
EARNING A FAILING GRADE: A REPORT CARD ON 1992 DRUG MANUFACTURER PRICE 
INFLATION, STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 
(Comm. Print 1993)). In fact, due to the large fixed sunk costs incurred by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, their profits are by no means excessive. One commentator analyzed the 
pharmaceutical industry's profitability relative to the industry's fixed costs and found quite 
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policy analyst, in discussing a comparable price rebate scheme for 
Medicare,204 characterized the nature of the drug industry and the ef­
fect of such a rebate as follows: 
Pharmaceutical research is a very risky business. A number of independ­
ent studies have found that between 5,000 and 10,000 compounds are 
tried on average for every 1 that makes it into a neighborhood pharmacy. 
And that one may be for a very tiny niche market. The incentive to en­
gage in such intense research and development is the potential for large 
profits on the few drugs that are successful. If the government limited 
profits on the successes, then there would be fewer resources devoted to 
research and development. This would translate into a reduced likeli­
hood that tomorrow's cures will be developed. Last year, U.S. pharma­
ceutical manufacturers invested $24 billion of their revenues to research 
new drugs. Jeopardizing such massive expenditures in the search for new 
medications quite literally would threaten the health of America's sen­
iors.205 
The argument that present-day volume increases mitigate price 
impact does not fully take into account the long-term and risk-based 
nature of the drug industry. Any excessive price impact - no matter 
how seemingly minimal - must be founded on an understanding of 
the opposite: the industry's profitability is within 1 % of its real cost of capital. Stanton, supra 
note 199, at 156 ("The common denominator by which to compare profit levels among dis­
parate industries is to measure their internal rate of return (IRR). In a study comparing in­
ternal rates of return from 1959 to 1973 among major industries, pharmaceuticals averaged 
12.9% IRR, while chemicals averaged 9.1 %, petroleum averaged 10.8%, and the average 
across all industries was 9.6%. More contemporary analyses have been done on the pharma­
ceutical industry alone, finding an IRR of 11.1 % against the industry's average real cost of 
capital of 10.5%. Thus the pharmaceutical industry's profitability is .within 1 % of its real cost 
of capital, clearly not an excessive level of profitability."). Thus, a supplemental state rebate 
compounded with the federal rebate will hinder research and development insofar as high 
profitability cannot cover those losses. 
204. See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical 
Marketplace, 66 Mo. L. REV. 341, 346 (2001) ("In 1965, the federal government created the 
Medicare program to provide public insurance to individuals from the age of sixty-five and 
to those with certain disabilities, and joined with the states under the auspices of the Medi­
caid program to extend health care coverage to those considered categorically or medically 
needy."). 
205. FROGUE, supra note 202; see also Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Returns 
to R&D on New Drug Introductions in the 1980s, 13 J. HEALTH ECON. 383 (1994) (finding in 
their 1994 study that between 1980 and 1984, only 30% of pharmaceuticals generated returns 
higher than their average after-tax research and development expenditures, and that the 
20% of products with the highest revenues generated only 70% of returns during the study 
time period.); F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceuti­
cal Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 106 (1993) (finding in his study that 55% of industry 
profits came from only 10% of pharmaceuticals); Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy 
and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and the Interface Between Competition and Patent 
Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363, 373-74 (2000) ("Thus, 
given the high costs and risks associated with 'drug research, companies must rely on a lim­
ited number of highly successful products to finance their continuing R&D."). 
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the long-term projections206 that manufacturers make and the poten­
tially resultant billion dollar decreases in research and development 
that could ensue.207 This is a detriment to the consumer, to society in 
general, and to the Medicaid recipient which militates against the 
value of lower prices. Lower prices may be a benefit to Medicaid re­
cipients at first glance. The benefit, however, is severely undermined 
by taking note of prescription drugs' small role in Medicaid vis-a-vis 
the long-term repercussions on research and development.208 In this 
light, the benefit must therefore be tempered when weighing it against 
the burdens on interstate commerce. 
In relation to the small benefits behind the statute, the burdens on 
interstate commerce are significant. The most significant burden on 
interstate commerce by the state prior authorization statutes is the 
economic devastation in the form of lost profits to manufacturers.209 
Consequently, any balancing test must take into account the profits 
that manufacturers will lose due to the state regulation because of the 
burdensome effects of such losses on the interstate prescription drug 
market. The First Circuit in balancing the effects of the Maine statute, 
however, refused to place these lost profits in the balance.210 The First 
Circuit justified its refusal by citing to the Third Circuit case of Ford 
Motor Company v. Insurance Commissioner21 1 as standing for the 
proposition that "devastating economic consequences on a particular 
interstate firm is not sufficient to rise to a Commerce Clause bur­
den."212 Although a valid justification, after a closer reading of Ford 
206. Pharmaceutical Research & Mfrs. Ass'n of America, Why Are Patents So Crucial?, 
at http://innovation.phrma.org (last visited Aug. 23, 2002) ("[l]t often takes more than 15 
years and more than $500 million to bring a new medicine to consumers."). 
207. See Daniels, supra note 197, at B7 ("Drug research is probably the riskiest eco­
nomic venture we know; only one of 5,000 possibilities researched ever becomes a marketed 
product."); see also Mezrich, supra note 1 94, at 136 n.37 (noting the "inherent risk and ex­
pense of R&D" and recounting the real possibility of a U.S. pharmaceutical corporation 
"expending billions on R&D [and failing] to recoup their investment and end(ing] up bank­
rupt"). 
208. See supra notes 1 93-207 and accompanying text. 
209. Phann. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 84 (1st Cir. 2001) (dis-
cussing the effect of lost profits on interstate commerce). 
210. Id. 
211. 874 F.2d 926 (3rd Cir. 1989). 
212. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 84 (internal quotations omitted). In addition, the First 
Circuit noted the difficulty of weighing the possible effects - including the potential loss of 
profits - instead of the actual effects of the statute. This seems to be more of a criticism of 
the use of a balancing test in general rather than a separate justification for the court's fail­
ure to consider lost profits (actual or possible). The court's recognition of the difficulties in 
foreseeing the future is understandable. Nonetheless, the court's task requires such a prog­
nosticative role under the balancing test employed in dormant commerce clause jurispru­
dence for effects are not always visible and quantifiable upon first inspection. In any event, 
this Note treats the First Circuit's complaint as separate from its refusal to balance lost prof­
its and therefore does not consider it in the discussion of devastating economic conse­
quences. For a general criticism of balancing, see Regan, supra note 42. 
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Motor, the Third Circuit's rule does not apply in the present case for 
two reasons. 
First, Ford Motor invalidated the use of lost profits in the balance 
because of the plaintiffs' impure motives in that case - an impurity 
missing in the state prior authorization statutes. The Third Circuit 
stated that the plaintiff companies213 in that case could not "hope to 
invoke the Constitution at every tum to circumvent state regulation 
and insure unrestricted expansion and protection of their opportunity 
to obtain the greatest margin of profit."214 The court, in effect, utilized 
a type of motive review215 and saw evidence of greedy corporate plain­
tiffs who were seeking to break and circumvent the law for their own 
gain.216 Consequently, this sort of "unclean hands" analysis must be 
seen as driving the Third Ciicuit's rationale in excluding profits.217 
Regardless of the validity of such analysis, in the case of state prior 
authorization laws, manufacturers do not have this same impure mo­
tive. The manufacturers already rebate their drugs below market-level 
pursuant to the federal rebate provisions.218 Furthermore, as afore­
mentioned, the federal rebate program started on the manufacturers' 
213. The two plaintiffs were Ford Motor Company and United States Automobile 
Association. Each plaintiff had a wholly independent and separate case, but the cases were 
consolidated on appeal because of the factual and legal commonalities. Ford Motor Co., 874 
F.2d at 929. 
214. Id. at 944. 
215. This should not be confused with the traditional meaning of motive review - a re­
view of the legislative motives behind the passage of legislation - which is quite coinciden­
tally employed frequently in assessing dormant commerce clause cases. See Regan, supra 
note 42, at 1143-1160; see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Wilson v. Black 
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316 (1819). Motive review in the present context is more akin to an unclean hands 
analysis - an examination of the party's actions and motives. 
216. Plaintiffs were holding companies who acquired numerous savings and loan com­
panies and their subsidiaries. Plaintiffs already owned various subsidiaries that were in the 
business of selling insurance. Through the expansion of their corporate endeavors into the 
realm of savings and loans, plaintiffs - with malice aforethought - were in clear violation 
of a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting savings and loan companies from providing insurance 
in that state. Ford Motor Co., 874 F.2d at 929-31 .  Thus, from the facts of the case, the court 
may have inferred that plaintiffs' widespread expansion, with the knowledge that such ex­
pansion would place them in violation of Pennsylvania law, was an attempt to have their 
cake and eat it too. 
217. In fact, the Third Circuit began its analysis with a caveat that rather than drawing 
attention away from the normative judgment it was making, simply placed a purposefully 
thin veil over what was quite apparent. The court initially cautioned: "[The plaintiffs' corpo­
rate] strategy is their own choosing and we express no value judgments concerning it." Ford 
Motor Co. , 874 F.2d at 943. Yet the court then proceeded to make those very value judg­
ments by characterizing the companies as ones engaged in "unrestricted expansion" and 
seeking "the greatest margin of profit." Id. Whether or not the court intended to poorly 
mask the value judgments it later made is uncertain. Nonetheless, a close reading of Ford 
Motor reveals motive review of plaintiffs' actions. 
218. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8 (West 2000). 
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own initiative.219 This is strong evidence that the pharmaceutical 
manufacturers' motive is not entirely profit-seeking in nature. The 
concern manufacturers have with state rebate statutes is that they are 
excessive and may compromise the companies' abilities to research 
and to develop new drugs - the lifeline of the drug industry.220 Be­
cause Ford Motor employs an "unclean hands" analysis as a criterion 
for disregarding lost profits, the rule of Ford Motor should not apply 
to the pharmaceutical companies whose motives in the context of 
Medicaid are more self-preserving than self-serving.221 
The second distinction between Ford Motor and the present case is 
the difference between interstate insurance and interstate pharmaceu­
tical markets. The Third Circuit relied upon Exxon Corporation v. 
Governor of Maryland222 in its analysis of the use of lost profits.223 The 
Supreme Court in Exxon reasoned that because the Commerce Clause 
protects the interstate market and not particular interstate firms from 
burdensome regulations, the central inquiry is into the effects upon 
the market.224 This is not to say that lost profits cannot affect the inter­
state market and therefore gain relevancy. The Third Circuit recog­
nized this salient point and characterized the Maryland market in 
Exxon as one rich with an availability of substitutes; if refiners with­
drew from the market, other interstate refiners would easily replace 
them and thus the regulation would place no burden upon interstate 
commerce.225 Similarly, the Third Circuit found in Ford Motor that if 
the plaintiffs decided to leave the Pennsylvania market due to a de­
crease in profits caused by the regulation, other interstate insurers 
would take their place in the Pennsylvania market, and the burden 
would be placed not on the interstate market, but only on the exiting 
firms.226 Conversely, it follows that an absence of replacements for the 
219. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text. 
220. See supra notes 195-207 and accompanying text. 
221. In examining the key differences between plaintiffs' motives in Ford Motor and the 
present case, two additional points are noteworthy. First, in Ford Motor, 874 F.2d at 921-31, 
the plaintiffs expanded their corporate endeavors into a completely new realm. See supra 
note 216. The pharmaceutical manufacturers never altered their course of dealing. Second, 
in Ford Motor, the statute was on the books and plaintiffs, with knowledge of the law, made 
conscious business decisions to violate the statute. Id. The Maine Program was enacted long 
after the pharmaceutical manufacturers had entered the Maine market. See supra note 16 
and accompanying text. Thus, in the case of PhRMA, the manufacturers never engaged in 
the same "unrestricted expansion" {change in business) designed to "circumvent state regu­
lation" (with prior knowledge of the state statute) that the Third Circuit abhorred and con­
sidered unclean. See supra notes 214-216 and accompanying text. 
222. 437 U.S. 117  (1978). 
223. Ford Motor Co. , 874 F.2d at 944. 
224. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127-28. 
225. Ford Motor Co. , 874 F.2d at 944 (construing Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127). 
226. Id. 
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exiting firms would burden interstate commerce, thereby making the 
lost profits - and their effects on the market - a relevant item to be 
balanced. 
The pharmaceutical market operates with much less opportunity 
for substitute goods than the insurance market found in Ford Motor, 
and the lack of replacements in the pharmaceutical market thus forces 
a court to balance lost profits. Research-based drug manufacturers 
have patent protection over their innovative prescription drugs for a 
number of years.227 Thus, if a manufacturer were to leave the Maine 
market because of Maine's rebate provision and take its drug with it, 
then presumably no one could replace that drug on the market due to 
its patent protection. Although generic manufacturers may manufac­
ture such drugs once the patents expire,228 generic manufacturers do 
not serve as adequate replacements as far as Medicaid is concerned. 
The most highly-sought after drugs by Medicaid recipients are the 
newer, cutting-edge medications - drugs presumably not yet off pat­
ent.229 Due to patent protection,230 the pharmaceutical market for each 
prescription drug not off patent is monopolistic and therefore not re-
227. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . .  To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."); 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West 
2000); Innovation, Intellectual Property and Patents (2001), at http://www.innovation.phrma 
.org/policy/2001-04-29.38.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2002) ("For new medicines, the effective 
patent life for pharmaceuticals is actually closer to 11 or 12 years."); Prescription Drug Costs: 
Federal Regulation of the Industry (2002), at http://www.bcbshealthissues.com/ 
proactive/newsroom/release.html?id,,,17521 (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) (discussing the Hatch­
Waxman Act, Orphan Drug Act, and other relevant patent laws). 
228. Hatch-Waxman Act: The Basics, at http://innovation.phrma.org/studyguides/ 
hwbasics.phtml (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) ("Once a brand name drug's patent expires, a copy 
of the brand name drug can be manufactured and marketed, so long as it meets FDA re­
quirements."). 
229. Statement of Gerianne Hap, supra note 195 ("While spending for prescription 
drugs under Medicaid has been rising, that is a result of more people using more and newer 
medicines . . . .  "). In addition to the newer research-drugs being hot commodities, these 
drugs are the most expensive and consequently most targeted for rebates and other price 
controls. See Stanton, supra note 199, at 150 ("The segment of the pharmaceutical market 
most in need of price controls are those medicines under patent protection, since the patent 
effectively limits or at least delays competition. Thus to be effective, government price con­
trols must target patented drugs."). 
230. See U.S. CONST. art. I , § 8; Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act, 21 U.S.C.A. 335 (West 2000). 
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placeable by other interstate firms.231 This lack of substitution in the 
pharmaceutical market distinguishes it from the Ford Motor market.232 
Lost profits by pharmaceutical manufacturers and those profits' ef­
fects upon the interstate market must be weighed in a dormant com­
merce clause balancing test. Lost profits from the state rebate laws can 
produce potentially devastating economic damage to the prescription 
drug market by forcing manufacturers out of the market and leaving 
no adequate replacement products.233 Medicaid patients would be left 
without necessary drugs, or manufacturers would remain and sell re­
bated drugs at a significant loss, eating away at research and develop­
ment and future drug development.234 Both scenarios are unacceptable 
and reflect the significant burden of lost profits that the prior authori­
zation statutes impose upon interstate commerce.235 These losses rep­
resent a serious burden to interstate commerce and tip the balance 
against the state statutes.236 
231. Quick Guide to Intellectual Property, at http:/linnovation.phrma.org/studyguides/ 
intellpropertyguide.phtml (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) ("Patents are the legal protection for 
inventions, including new medicines discovered by research-based pharmaceutical compa­
nies. A patent in the United States, as in most developed nations and many developing coun­
tries, is a grant from the government to the inventor that essentially gives him or her the ex­
clusive right to use and sell the invention for a defined number of years. At the heart of the 
patent is the corresponding right to exclude others from making, using and selling the inven­
tion."). 
232. This analysis is more relevant for those pharmaceuticals without therapeutic substi­
tutes and, as aforementioned, generally inapplicable to those drugs off-patent. See supra 
notes 227-231 and accompanying text. Yet regulation - whether in the form of rebates or 
other price controls - could serve to undermine the competition that does exist between 
therapeutic substitutes/off-patent drugs and patented pharmaceuticals. See Patricia M. 
Danzon & Li-Wei Chao, Does Regulation Drive Out Competition In Pharmaceutical Mar­
kets? 43 J. L. & ECON. 311, 312 (2000) ("Generic market shares of off-patent products are 
significantly higher in countries that permit (relatively) free pricing, such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, than in countries with strict price or reimburse­
ment regulation, such as France, Italy, and Japan."). 
233. See supra notes 227-232 and accompanying text. 
234. See supra notes 201-207 and accompanying text. 
235. In fact, the first scenario - Medicaid patients left without necessary drugs - is al­
ready a reality. In response to the Michigan prior authorization statute, six of the world's 
largest drug companies entered into a collusive boycott by refusing to rebate their drugs un­
der the Michigan statute. Gold et al., supra note 11 (reporting that the six boycotting com­
panies are "Eli Lilly & Co., Indianapolis; Johnson & Johnson, New Brunswick, N.J.; Merck; 
Pfizer; Pharmacia Corp., Peapack, N.J.; and Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, the prescription 
drug unit of American Home Products Corp., Madison, N.J."). Boycotts such as these illus­
trate the long-term ramifications of prior authorization insofar as manufacturers are willing 
to give up present market share presumably in order to curb a long-term economically dev­
astating scheme. Id. Further, consider the potential for similar boycotts in light of the fact 
that numerous other states and even private health insurance companies plan on imple­
menting similar prior authorization programs. Id.; see also Maine Appeals Halt on its R.x 
Plan, supra note 26 (stating that roughly twenty-eight other states are planning to introduce 
legislation similar to Maine's). 
236. A critical inquiry in dormant commerce clause cases - specifically in the case of 
extraterritorial statutes - is "what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State 
adopted similar legislation." Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1998). Presumably if lost 
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Finally, the state prior authorization statutes fail under a balancing 
test because the burdens on interstate commerce are magnified when 
one recognizes PhRMA as a politically discriminated against group 
that deserves judicial protection.237 This argument is a variation on a 
theme238 first expressed in famous footnote four of United States v. 
Carolene Products Company.239 At first glance, considering PhRMA 
- a group that accounts for more than 75 percent of brand-name drug 
sales in the United States240 - a "discrete and insular"241 group seems 
counterintuitive. Yet rather than focusing upon the "discrete and in-
profits are considered in light of this principle, then the burden greatly increases in degree, 
and any "possible effects" become much more real and even inevitable. 
237. Courts in general should consider the political processes in a dormant commerce 
clause query. Although political concerns are not traditionally an item to be placed into the 
burden/benefit balance, a court's concern with preserving political processes shows the moti­
vating factor behind the inquiry and consequently serves as the primary justification to bal­
ance in the first place. See Regan, supra note 42, at 1166 (noting the traditional Carolene 
Products scholar's argument that the Carotene Products dormant commerce clause theory 
provides the justification for balancing). For example, if a court were to determine that the 
purpose of the dormant commerce clause is to prohibit protectionism, then the decision to 
balance and everything within the balance would be viewed through anti-protectionist 
glasses. Regan advocates the primacy of protectionism (yet by no means endorses balanc­
ing). Id. Similarly, if a court were to consider protecting the politically under-represented as 
a principal dormant commerce clause concern, a court would use its discretion in weighing 
the balance in order to tip in favor of the under-represented. Thus, the glasses that the court 
wears will help give meaning to the items already placed on the scales. To put it another 
way, it may be much more important to choose the right balance than to choose the right 
items of measure. (Of course, the added meaning of a political theory is also pertinent in an 
extraterritorial analysis. Due to the large discretion in a balancing test, however, a court may 
be able to better serve its purposes in this context rather than in an extraterritorial setting -
a reason why the political analysis js discussed here and not earlier). 
The political process balance is one of great significance as far as the dormant commerce 
clause is concerned mainly because it is a political theory that can solve the federal-state and 
separation-of-powers problems inherent in dormant commerce clause cases. See Mark 
Tushnet, Rethinking The Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125, 164-65. This 
becomes especially pertinent in the present case because of federalism's special role in 
Medicaid. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Thus, in choosing the appropriate 
balance, the political process balance must be given strong consideration. 
238. The variation is based on Professor Bruce Ackerman's view of Carolene Products. 
Professor Ackerman eschews the "discrete and insular" language of Carotene Products and 
argues that the true focus in examining political dysfunction should be on those groups that 
are prejudiced, regardless of their discreteness or insularity. Bruce Ackerman, Beyond 
Carotene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). 
239. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities 
may be a special condition . . .  curtail[ing] the operation of those political processes ordinar­
ily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and [so] may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry."). 
240. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and other Relief at para. 8, Pharm. Research 
& Mfrs. of Am. v. Meadows, 184 F.Supp.2d 1186 (N.D. Fl. 2001) {No. 4:01cv356-ws). 
241. The terms "discrete" and "insular" are probably open to differing and controversial 
meanings. This Note, however, adopts the sensible sociological definitions advanced by Pro­
fessor Ackerman. Thus, "insularity" describes the "tendency of group members to interact 
with great frequency in a variety of social contexts." Ackerman, supra note 238, at 726. A 
group is considered "discrete" "when its members are marked out in ways that make it rela­
tively easy for others to identify them." Id. at 729. 
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sular" language of Carolene Products, PhRMA deserves protection as 
justified by the language in the footnote protecting those who languish 
under the burden of prejudice. PhRMA is a group prejudiced against 
in the political processes and therefore should be judicially pro­
tected. 242 Rather than attempt to suggest that PhRMA possesses the 
characteristics of either a discrete or insular group, this Note argues 
that the reasoning behind Carotene Products does not stand for the 
protection only of the discrete and insular, but also of "politically inef­
fective majorities." As PhRMA is one such ineffective group, it de­
serves the special attention of the court.243 
The "prejudice" language of Carolene Products is sometimes ig­
nored to the detriment of the under-represented.244 Therefore, politi­
cally ineffective majorities that feel the impact of society's prejudice 
and are ineffective because of this prejudice, often find themselves 
without a voice in the formulation of laws that affect them.245 If 
Carolene Products is truly concerned with political dysfunction, then it 
is the disdain for prejudice which should serve to protect both the "dif­
fuse and anonymous" as well as the "insular and discrete."246 As one 
scholar queries, "Why should the concern with . 'prejudice' justify 
Carolene's narrow fixation upon 'discrete and insular' minorities?"247 
Simply put, it should not.248 If a group is ineffective in the legislative 
242. See infra notes 249-250, 254. 
243. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing for 
special judicial attention for prejudiced groups); Ackerman, supra note 238. 
244. Ackerman, supra note 238, at 731 ("Carotene's empirical inadequacy stems from its 
underinclusive conception of the impact of prejudice upon American society."). 
245. See Ackerman, supra note 238, at 722-23. 
246. Id. at 724. 
247. Id. at 732. 
248. See ELY, supra note 243, at 153 {noting that prejudice properly addresses the un­
constitutional motivations of the legislature, whereas discreteness and insularity do not). 
Insularity and discreteness may even be advantageous in the political arena, especially 
relative to those prejudiced against. As Professor Ackerman posits, the problem with the 
language of Carotene Products is that it "disdains the easy case in its eagerness to pronounce 
on harder ones." Ackerman, supra note 238, at 722-23. Insular and discrete groups normally 
have tremendous bargaining advantages, id. at 723-24, and thus to offer protection to such 
groups was a bold and broad stroke by the Court. The bargaining advantages of an insular 
and discrete group come in the form of increased political resources and lower organiza­
tional costs relative to an anonymous and diffuse group. Id. at 726. As Professor Ackerman 
explains, insularity "will help breed sentiments of group solidarity." Id. at 725. Thus, a group 
that possesses solidarity is more likely to make symbolic contributions for political purposes. 
Id. Moreover, a group's insularity can easily lead to the exposure of non-contributing free­
riders and thereby increase resources by curbing free-riding. Id. In way of organizational 
costs, insular groups have pre-existing channels of communication and therefore find it 
cheaper to organize. Id. at 726. Similarly, a discrete group - due to the ease of recognition 
of members - will find it cheaper and easier to organize. Id. at 730-31 ;  see also ELY, supra 
note 243, at 157-60. 
The absence of language supporting "the easy cases," however, does not foreclose appli­
cation of the principle to those cases. An observation of the case law concludes that Carotene 
Products is more concerned with political weakness propagated by attacks on egalitarianism 
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forum due to widespread and systematic prejudice, then that group -
more than any other - must be protected under the spirit of Carolene 
Products. 
PhRMA is a victim of prejudice and should thus be protected in 
the political processes. The portrayal of drug companies as "evil" and 
"profit-seeking" by members of the media and even high-ranking po­
litical leaders249 has seemingly undermined their political power.250 
Although it is difficult to examine the motives of and influences upon 
the enacting state legislatures,251 the mere evidence of widespread so­
cietal prejudice against drug companies gives rise to the inference of 
unconstitutional, prejudicial motivations behind the state prior 
authorization statutes.252 Moreover, a mere inference would be ample 
to justify a more searching judicial inquiry under Carolene Products.253 
The inference is further strengthened by PhRMA's ineffectiveness in 
preventing the passage of the Maine Program in spite of its strenuous 
than with the weakness of the single insular group. Ackerman, supra note 238, at 723. The 
opportunity for all to equally participate in the political processes, and not the nature of the 
group denied participation, is at the core of Carotene Products. See ELY, supra note 243, at 
77 (arguing that the focus of Carotene Products is "whether the opportunity to participate 
either in the political processes by which values are appropriately identified and accommo­
dated, or in the accommodation those processes have reached, has been unduly con­
stricted"). 
249. See Robert Pear, U.S. Backs Florida Plan to Cut Drug Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 
2001, at A14 ("Governor Bush, a Republican, denounced the lawsuit. 'Protecting the large 
profit margins of multibillion (dollar] pharmaceutical companies is not a priority,' he said."); 
Maggie Gallagher, Goring My Health and Yours, TOWNHALL.COM, Sept. 15, 2000, at 
http:f/www.townhall.com/columnists/maggiegallagher/mg2000915/shtml (discussing former 
Vice-president Al Gore's characterization of drug companies as "evil" during his 2000 presi­
dential campaign); Michael Fumento, Goring Drug Companies: A Plan That Doesn't Help 
the Elderly, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 25, 2000, at http:f/www.fumento.com/gorecampaign. 
html (discussing Gore's negative depiction of drug companies). 
250. See Philip Morrising the Drug Companies - Part 3, para. 1 1 ,  at http:f/www. 
yourdoctorinthefamily.com/commentary/comm017.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2002) ("[W]hat 
we are actually seeing is yet another escalation of the war against drug companies, a war that 
will follow the model of the war recently waged against big tobacco. And the first step of 
such a war (as in any war) is to dehumanize the enemy so that it's okay to slaughter them."); 
Stephanie Stapleton, AMA: Science must be key in off-label drug information, 
AMEDNEWS.COM, Aug. 18, 1997, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_97/ 
pick0818.htm (" 'The FDA has felt that drug companies are evil monsters out there to dupe 
the physicians,' said John Seigfried, MD, deputy vice president for scientific and regulatory 
affairs for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America."); Key Martin, 
"Medications For Every Nation"/ Pills Cost Pennies, Greed Costs Lives, at 
http:f/www.peoplesvideo.org/hiv_dc.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2002) (discussing the view that 
drug companies seek profits at the expense of human lives). 
251. See ELY, supra note 243, at 138 ("[D]etermining whether an illegitimate motivation 
influenced a decision can be very difficult."). 
252. Id. (noting that there will be situations where a "responsible inference that the ac­
tion was unconstitutionally motivated will be possible"). 
253. Id. ("[I]t often will not be possible responsibly to conclude that the challenged ac­
tion was the product of an unconstitutional motivation, (but that does not mean] . . .  that the 
inquiry should not be undertaken."). 
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lobbying efforts and organizational advantages.254 Ultimately, the in­
ference of prejudice - an inference based on vociferous anti-PhRMA 
statements by political leaders and a war-like rhetoric by media and 
grass-roots groups against the drug industry255 - seems strong enough 
to be of concern to a Carolene Products court. Therefore, at the very 
least, the prejudice factor should be considered in a balancing test and 
should tip in favor of PhRMA in order to preserve the talismanic po­
litical processes. 
Under a balancing test that measures the burdens and benefits of a 
state law on interstate commerce, the state statutes must be struck 
down as unconstitutional. The perceived local benefits of lower prices 
for Medicaid recipients are not of great significance. In fact, these 
benefits may actually serve to undermine pharmaceutical research and 
development and thus hurt these same consumers in the future. 
Moreover, the burdens of potential lost profits by manufacturers on 
the interstate market militate against upholding the statutes. Finally, 
the more searching judicial inquiry of a revised Carotene Products 
theory suggests protection of PhRMA as an ineffective and persecuted 
interest group within the political processes. This protection is the fi­
nal constitutional determinate in tipping the balance and demonstrat­
ing the excessive burden of the state statutes relative to the statutes' 
minimal benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note concludes that state prior authorization statutes run con­
trary to the congressional intent behind prior authorization - an in­
tent that clearly calls for the use of prior authorization to curb unnec­
essary over-prescription. By utilizing a purposive interpretive theory, 
254. PhRMA, for example, waged a vociferous advertising campaign in Maine protest­
ing the Maine Program, yet the law passed quite easily. See Page, supra note 198. In general, 
PhRMA has been unsuccessful in its lobbying efforts recently despite the expenditure of vast 
sums of money. For example, in 1999, the pharmaceutical industry was Washington's top 
lobbying spender, yet it failed to achieve its primary goal of obtaining a tax credit for re­
search and development. See Pharma lobbying figures from the Center for Responsive Poli­
tics, at http:/llists.essential.org/pipermail/pharm-policy/2001-June/ 001110.htm (last visited 
June 4, 2001). 
Moreover, PhRMA's localized lobbying losses - as exemplified in Maine - are more 
indicative of a prejudice at the state level. The inference of prejudice within state legislatures 
is in part based on the fact that state budgetary pressures serve as incentives for states to act 
upon public hostility towards pharmaceutical companies. See John Sanko, Medicaid Costs 
Threaten Budget; Legislators Struggle with Runaway Costs for State Health Insurance, 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7391966 (" 'Medicaid was 
driving most states' budgets into the red, even before the additional economic downturn that 
resulted from the Sept. 11 attack,"analyst Alexis Senger told lawmakers." Moreover, ac­
cording to Senger, 36 states reported Medicaid over-expenditures in fiscal 2001 of up to 19.7 
percent). Although PhRMA's lobbying losses are hardly conclusive in demonstrating any 
prejudicial effect, they may have some probative value in drawing an inference of prejudice. 
255. See supra notes 249-250 and accompanying text. 
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congressional intent becomes more apparent in light of the greater le­
gal context of Medicaid. Therefore, federal law must preempt such 
statutes. 
Moreover, this Note demonstrates that state prior authorization 
statutes violate the dormant commerce clause as being extraterritorial 
regulations, as well as failing under a balancing test where the burdens 
on commerce are excessive in relation to the local benefits. Although 
not a traditional Carolene Products group, PhRMA never received a 
fair shake in the hostile and prejudiced political arena which gave 
birth to the Maine Program. With the judicial concern for advancing 
fair representation of prejudiced and ineffective groups in the political 
fora in mind, the excessiveness of the burdens upon interstate com­
merce becomes evident. Due to the constitutional limitations upon 
state prior authorization statutes, they cannot serve as appropriate 
legislative means to further the interests of Medicaid and its recipients. 
The Maine Program is a regulatory scheme with a noble ideal. Yet 
in its efforts to further the interests of its Medicaid recipients, Maine 
undermines the interests of all. Maine's program is not only unconsti­
tutional, but it also hinders health care and restricts long-term phar­
maceutical research and development. The Supreme Court now awaits 
to settle this dispute. At stake could be the future of health care in this 
country as we know it. 
